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The best way to predict the future is to invent it. –Alan Kay1 
  INTRODUCTION   
 The web is the ultimate matchmaker, capitalizer, and 
economizer. New digital technologies are turning everything 
into an available resource: services, products, spaces, connec-
tions, and knowledge, all of which would otherwise be collecting 
 
 1. Alan C. Kay, Predicting the Future, 1 STAN. ENGINEERING 1, 1–6 
(1989), http://www.ecotopia.com/webpress/futures.htm. 
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dust. It’s been called “the sharing economy,”2 “the disaggregat-
ed economy,”3 “the peer-to-peer economy” (P-2-P),4 “the human-
to-human economy” (H-2-H),5 “the community marketplace,”6 
“the on-demand economy,”7 “the App economy,”8 “the access 
economy,”9 “the mesh economy,”10 “the gig economy,”11 and also, 
“the Uberization of everything.”12 Each of these terms repre-
sents an aspect of the digital platform revolution, but none 
completely captures the entire scope of the paradigmatic shift 
in the ways we produce, consume, work, finance, and learn. A 
new wave of start-ups, relying on digital platform technology, 
are connecting people and transforming behavior and relation-
ships outside of the digital world, tapping into underutilized 
human, social, and real capital. This new economy dramatically 
extends the lifecycle of products, shortens time of use, and ex-
ponentially expands connectivity and access. These new busi-
ness models are generating billions of dollars annually and 
show overwhelming rates of growth.13 Most importantly, the 
 
 2. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2013), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/21573104. 
 3. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Gov-
ernment Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 917 (2015). 
 4. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2. 
 5. Tom Lowery, Human to Human (H2H) – Collaboration Is the New 
Competition, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/tom-lowery/human-to-humancollaborati_b_4696790.html. 
 6. Carrie Melissa Jones, Uber, Mint, and Square Investor Rob Hayes 
Shares What He Looks for in Community-Driven Startups, VENTURE BEAT 
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.venturebeat.com/2015/03/14/uber-mint-and 
-square-investor-rob-hayes-shares-what-he-looks-for-in-community-driven 
-companies. 
 7. Kashmir Hill, Meet the Lawyer Taking on Uber and the Rest of the On-
Demand Economy, FUSION (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.fusion.net/story/ 
118401/meet-the-lawyer-taking-on-uber-and-the-on-demand-economy. 
 8. Robinson Meyer, The App Economy Is Now ‘Bigger Than Hollywood,’ 
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2015/01/the-app-economy-is-now-bigger-than-hollywood/384842. 
 9. Steve Denning, Three Strategies for Managing the Economy of Access, 
FORBES (May 2, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/05/02/ 
economic-game-change-from-ownership-to-access. 
 10. See LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHAR-
ING 15–19 (2010). 
 11. Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 3, at 925. 
 12. Sunny Freeman, ‘Uberization’ of Everything Is Happening, but Not 
Every ‘Uber’ Will Succeed, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/01/uberization-uber-of-everything_n_6971752.html. 
 13. See generally The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: U.K., http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/ 
collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue 
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platform economy is radically changing the traditional 
equilibria of supply and demand, blurring the lines between 
owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and con-
tractors, and transcending the spatial divides of personal and 
professional, business and home, market and leisure, friend 
and client, acquaintance and stranger, public and private. 
Companies are introducing that which was non-commodifiable 
to the market—whether it is a ride share, a spare bedroom, a 
spot on a waitlist, or a loan for a lawnmower. What has previ-
ously been relegated to the realm of personal property is shift-
ing to the realm of access: instead of installing clunky rabbit-
ear antennae, people pay to access thousands of tiny anten-
nas;14 instead of purchasing a bicycle, users pick up and drop off 
bicycles at hubs all around the city;15 and instead of owning a 
vacation home, hosts swap houses during the holidays.16 
Unsurprisingly, then, the platform economy defies conven-
tional regulatory theory. Millions of people are becoming part-
time entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models 
and entrenched market interests, and challenging regulated 
industries, all while turning ideas about consumption, work, 
risk, and ownership on their head. Paradoxically, as the digital 
platform economy becomes more established, we are also at an 
all-time high in regulatory permitting, licensing, and protec-
tion. The battle over law in the platform is, therefore, both fun-
damentally conceptual and highly practical. New business 
models such as Uber, Airbnb, and Aereo have received massive 
amounts of support from venture capitalists, but have also re-
ceived strong pushback from incumbent stakeholders, regula-
tors, and courts. The spectrum of responses is dramatically 
broad. While some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom 
and San Francisco are positioning themselves as champions of 
the platform by introducing policies that will aid its expansion, 
 
-opportunity.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (describing the scale and growth 
of businesses within the sharing economy). 
 14. Aereo allowed individuals to record live over-the-air television without 
the costs associated with cable television. See infra text accompanying notes 
55–58. 
 15. See generally Two Distinct Ways To Utilize Decobike, DECOBIKE, 
http://www.decobike.com/sandiego/how-it-works (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) 
(describing the process for using the bike sharing service, Decobike). 
 16. One such service is HomeExchange, which allows individuals to swap 
homes with other individuals for short periods of time. Here’s How Home Ex-
change Works, HOMEEXCHANGE, https://www.homeexchange.com/en/how-it 
-works (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
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other legal regimes such as those in New York, Nevada, Flori-
da, and Germany are introducing new policies to constrain the 
platform. Around the United States, class actions against Uber, 
Lyft, and other platform apps are underway.17 The scholarly 
debates are schismatic, either celebrating the platform econo-
my as a utopic shift from capitalism to communal sharing, or 
decrying the dystopian effects of the platform evading existing 
regulations and protections. 
Despite the tremendous interest that the platform is at-
tracting from regulators and scholars, the literature has thus 
far failed to offer a comprehensive account of law in the new 
platform economy. Are companies like Uber and Lyft digital 
clearinghouses connecting independent drivers-for-hire with 
customers, or rather are they employers violating wage-and-
hour laws? Are zoning laws parsing parts of town for short-
term rentals still relevant when residential property owners 
list their homes on Airbnb? Was Aereo, which went bankrupt 
following its recent Supreme Court defeat, a digital antenna 
rental company, or a service that streams broadcasted content, 
thereby infringing copyright? Is TaskRabbit just an app to con-
nect people searching for odd jobs, or a manpower agency that 
should withhold taxes? Companies such as Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, 
Aereo, and TaskRabbit have been running against existing 
regulations and the legal battles often turn on how to define 
the platform business: Are these digital companies service pro-
viders or brokers of individualized exchanges? Should they be 
viewed as merely enabling intermediaries or robust corporate 
infrastructures? 
This Article argues that the platform economy is present-
ing not only a paradigmatic shift for business, but also for legal 
theory. Consumer protection laws, safety and health regula-
tions, business permits and licenses, property and zoning laws, 
and financial services regulations have all risen dramatically in 
the past few decades. The reasons for this surge range from 
public welfare and quality control to less benign goals, such as 
entry restrictions, lobbied for by incumbent industry actors. 
 
 17. See Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being 
Sued to Death, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death (describ-
ing a class-action lawsuit against the platform app, Handy); Marcus Pringle, 
California Court Addresses Employee Status of Uber, Lyft Drivers, ROETZEL 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.ralawemployment.blogspot.com/2015/02/california 
-court-addresses-employee.html (noting the initiation of class-action lawsuits 
against both Uber and Lyft). 
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Each body of law is increasingly at odds with bottom-up online 
platform businesses that offer new models of connectivity and 
exchange. The platform economy does not only disrupt regulat-
ed industries but also demands that we inquire into the logic of 
their correlated regulations. It requires that we go back to first 
principles about public intervention and market innovation, or, 
what I term, the regulation-innovation nexus. 
The Article uncovers the ways in which digital platform-
based businesses challenge the internal logic of regulated in-
dustries. By unpacking the economic and social impetuses for 
the rise of the platform economy, the Article develops a new 
framework for asking whether digital disruptions comprise 
loopholes akin to regulatory arbitrage, most prominently stud-
ied in the tax field; circumvention akin to controversial copy-
right protection reforms; or innovation-ripe negative spaces 
akin to design-around competition in patent law. This Article, 
by bringing together these different bodies of law, offers a con-
temporary account of the relevance of regulating new business 
models. Providing a new framework for understanding the reg-
ulation-innovation nexus, the Article argues that the legal dis-
ruptions created by the platform economy should be viewed as 
a feature, rather than a bug of regulatory limits. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the spec-
trum of conceptual challenges presented by third-generation 
digital business models, Web 3.0. The literature about the plat-
form is binary. There are feel-good stories about the revolution-
ary power of sharing and the easy rise of micro-entrepreneurs 
and grassroots exchanges contrasted against dystopian predic-
tions about the platform subverting established protections and 
unraveling the checks and balances historically placed to cor-
rect the market-produced unfairness. Transcending this utopi-
an/dystopian binary, Part II analyzes the technological, eco-
nomic, and social reasons for the rise of the platform economy 
and the ways the platform is changing each stage and aspect of 
market transaction costs. First, taking a Coasean perspective, 
Part II.A develops a novel taxonomy of ten distinct principles of 
the platform that together hold the potential to systematically 
reduce transaction costs: uber-scale, resurrection of dead capi-
tal, tailoring the transactional unit, the commodification of eve-
rything, deal customization, access over ownership, overhead 
elimination, reduced barriers to entry, pricing precision, and 
dynamic feedback systems. Next, in Part II.B, the Article shifts 
beyond the classic transaction-cost economic analysis to a be-
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havioral perspective, explaining how the platform shapes pref-
erence. The Section asserts that part of the value produced by 
the platform lies in its differentiation from traditional, offline 
exchanges. In other words, it reveals how the platform economy 
is not simply competing efficiently over the same markets of 
regulated industries but also constituting new markets, norms, 
and behaviors. 
Building upon these understandings of the internal logic 
informing the platform economy’s rise, Part III offers a new 
framework for understanding the range of laws and regulations 
that platform companies currently face. The Article shows that 
the regulatory challenges are divisible into easy and hard cas-
es. On one end of the spectrum are regulatory restrictions that 
operate as barriers to entry, including permitting, occupational 
licensing, and rate controls. These are the easy cases—
regulatory controls that regulators should not impose on the 
platform because they are largely designed to prevent entry. 
On the other end are taxation requirements. These are equally 
easy because they should be extended to the platform in a 
straightforward manner, and existing tax law lends itself to 
direct application on these new digital market exchanges. The 
hard cases encompass what lies in the regulatory spectrum be-
tween barriers to market entry and the taxation of revenues, 
namely laws for zoning, consumer protection, employment and 
labor, and intellectual property. These regulatory fields each 
have public welfare goals challenged by the shifts in market 
models, emerging social norms, and unstable preferences. 
Moreover, many of these regulatory goals are achievable 
through utilizing the technological advances of the very same 
business models that are disrupting established structures. 
Therefore, any inquiry into the regulation-innovation nexus 
requires an understanding of the comparative advantages of 
public intervention and the platform’s self-regulation. Part IV 
maps those latter shifts onto concepts based in innovation theo-
ry and policy—an interdisciplinary inquiry examining the role 
of law and regulation in the diffusion of technology and ideas. 
Integrating insights from different fields of law about regulato-
ry disruption, it considers the continued necessity of certain 
protections and examines the rise of self-regulatory practices. 
The Article demonstrates that the platform economy is still 
very much evolving, frequently comes with built-in regulatory 
devices, and thrives because of definitional defiance. By offer-
ing a first schematic treatment of law and the platform econo-
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my, this Article aims to provide scholars and policymakers a 
framework that identifies the conditions under which new 
business models transform economic structures and how law 
maps onto those shifts. 
I.  CECI N’EST PAS UN TAXI: DISRUPTION & 
DEFINITIONAL DEFIANCE   
In the interest of eliminating bureaucracy, overhead, middlemen and 
waste, I turned myself into a corporation. –Joel Stein, Time Maga-
zine18 
A. WEB 3.0: THE PLATFORM REVOLUTION 
Platform companies defy traditional regulatory theory the 
same way they defy traditional definition—by varying the 
products, services, and methods they employ to connect buyers 
and sellers, workers and those in need of services. For this rea-
son, the platform economy is easier to explain by way of func-
tion: a platform company is launched as an online intermediary 
between buyers and sellers of goods and services—the ancient 
role of the middleman—enhanced with the modern power af-
forded by cloud computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive 
wireless Internet access, scaled user-networks, and near-
universal customer ownership of smartphones and tablets. 
While earlier companies such as eBay and Amazon have served 
as a model for new platform companies, those companies main-
ly focused on retail of goods as well as online connectivity. More 
recently, the new wave of digital companies is based on the log-
ic of multi-sided markets that disrupt traditional offline inter-
actions by reshaping the ways individuals transact. Thus, while 
the timeline is not set in stone, it is useful to mark 2008, with 
the founding of Airbnb as the rise of the new wave of the plat-
form—a stunning number of fast-growing of algorithm-enabled 
cyber-places where constituents transact. Before that, there 
were some important developments in digital connectivity and 
sharing, including the launch of Napster in 1999, the rise of 
Wikipedia in 2001, and the spread of social networks, primarily 
Facebook and LinkedIn in 2004.19 These companies, however, 
 
 18. Joel Stein, Baby, You Can Drive My Car, and Do My Errands, and 
Rent My Stuff..., TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.time.com/3687305/testing 
-the-sharing-economy. 
 19. For a useful timeline graphic on the rise of the sharing economy, see 
Collaborative Consumption Infographic Timeline Chart, COLLABORATIVE 
CONSUMPTION, https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/images/Collaborativechart.jpg 
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created multi-sided connectivity that, for the most part, existed 
solely in the digital world. Therefore, as I will describe below, 
these developments are best understood as a prelude to the rise 
of the platform economy, an earlier generation of online innova-
tion. The new generation of platform business is increasingly 
challenging conventional industries in every realm. You don’t 
need to open a restaurant to host cooking events; you don’t 
need to become a taxi driver to sell rides; you don’t need to open 
a hotel to lodge guests; you don’t need to start a moving compa-
ny to get paid for helping someone relocate. 
Industries affected by the platform economy include hotels 
(Airbnb; Couchsurfing; Homeaway; VRBO); office space (Liquid 
Space; ShareDesk), parking spaces (ParkingPanda; Park Cir-
ca); transportation (Lyft; Sidecar; Uber); restaurants (EatWith; 
Feastly; Blue Apron; Munchery); used clothing (ThredUp); 
household tools (Open Shed); outdoor gear (Gearcommons); cap-
ital (Zopa; Prosper; Kickstarter; Bitcoin; Kiva); broadcasting 
(Aereo; FilmOn.com); legal services (Upcounsel); medical ser-
vices (Healthtap; Teledoc; CrowdMed); academic services 
(Uguru); everyday errands, such as grocery shopping and laun-
dry (TaskRabbit; Instacart; Airtasker; Washio); and specialized 
errands, such as flower delivery (BloomThat), dog walking 
(DogVacay), and package delivery (Shyp). Over 10,000 new 
platform companies have sprouted and mushroomed in less 
than a decade, and they continue to pop up daily.20 The plat-
form economy, while not easy to define or quantify, was valued 
at $26 billion in 2013, with predictions of exponential growth 
up to $110 billion in the next few years.21 A recent Pricewater-
houseCoopers (PwC) report predicts that global revenues from 
the platform sectors could hit $335 billion by 2025.22 “[L]ike 
Uber but for ___” pitches for venture capital funding are a daily 
occurrence.23 
 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 20. Stein, supra note 18. 
 21. Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing 
Economy Can Win over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https:// 
www.hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over 
-regulators. 
 22. The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, supra note 
13. 
 23. Kate Cox, Nobody Really Knows What To Do About Regulating the 
Sharing Economy, CONSUMERIST (June 10, 2015), https://www.consumerist 
.com/2015/06/10/nobody-really-knows-what-to-do-about-regulating-the-sharing 
-economy. 
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As noted, the platform economy’s offerings are so diverse 
that neatly describing its scope is impractical. There are vari-
ous ways to slice it. It includes the delivery of services, the 
sharing of assets, and the recirculation of goods, yet its rise 
must be understood in relation to its digital genealogy. First-
generation Internet companies introduced search engines like 
Google and Yahoo, which connected us to information and 
knowledge. Tim Berners-Lee, best known as the inventor of the 
World Wide Web, described the original essence of the Web as a 
space to collaborate, communicate, and share information.24 
The second generation, Web 2.0, extended search and commu-
nication, forming online marketplaces like Craigslist, eBay, and 
Amazon, as well as digital file sharing services like Napster 
and iTunes. These online companies disrupted the publishing, 
traditional news media, music, and most broadly, retail indus-
try at large. Amazon transformed and constricted the bricks-
and-mortar bookstores, and file sharing, coupled with digital 
music and film, changed the entertainment industry, effectively 
killing record and video stores. Moving beyond retail, the rise of 
the platform signifies the third generation of the Internet, Web 
3.0, in which technology is transforming the service economy, 
allowing greater access to offline exchanges for lower prices.25 
In turn, the physical infrastructure of offline markets is itself 
transformed by the technological infrastructure. 
Founded in San Francisco in 2008, Airbnb allows private 
individuals—named hosts—to rent out their homes or individu-
al rooms to visitors for a short amount of time.26 Within just a 
few years, Airbnb has grown dramatically; and is valued at $10 
billion27 with 2,000,000 properties listed in more than 190 coun-
tries.28 Analysts estimate that in 2015, Airbnb made $6 billion 
in gross bookings.29 It now offers more bookings than major ho-
 
 24. Web’s Inventor Gets a Knighthood, BBC NEWS (last updated Dec. 31, 
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3357073.stm. 
 25. See infra Figure 1; see also Stein, supra note 18 (noting that technolo-
gy has “come after” the service economy, with increased consumer access and 
lower prices). 
 26. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, 
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/ 
airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy. 
 27. Cannon & Summers, supra note 21. 
 28. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visit-
ed Oct. 14, 2016). 
 29. Rafat Ali, Airbnb’s Revenues Will Cross Half Billion Mark in 2015, 
Analysts Estimate, SKIFT (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.skift.com/2015/03/25/ 
airbnbs-revenues-will-cross-half-billion-mark-in-2015-analysts-estimate. 
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tel chains, such as Marriott and Hilton.30 At the same time, 
Airbnb defines itself very differently than a hotel chain, and, as 
it disrupts the hotel industry, it faces legal attacks on both leg-
islative and judicial fronts. In response to these vigorous at-
tempts to limit the platform’s operation, Airbnb has argued 
that existing laws simply neither capture its new business 
model, nor even fit the new economy.31 Airbnb describes its 
business model as a matching platform for private homes, con-
necting private individuals to other private individuals, while 
collecting a six percent to twelve percent booking fee.32 Airbnb 
owns no property and provides no services outside the digital 
realm.33 Similarly, in the commercial real estate rental market, 
Loosecubes, Regus, and DeskWanted have carved out the 
shared office space market, matching people who have an extra 
desk, studio, or office space with independent freelancers and 
entrepreneurs.34 Following a similar business model to Airbnb, 
Loosecubes charged a ten percent fee for each transaction, of-
fering spaces in 535 cities throughout sixty-six countries.35 
Valued at over $40 billion, Uber is perhaps the best-known 
example of a disruptive digital platform business.36 Founded in 
2009, the company coordinates over one million rides a day and 
is now valued higher than rental car giants Hertz and Avis.37 
 
 30. Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are 
Quiet, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/ 
12/business/airbnb-grows-to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for 
-now.html. 
 31. David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to 
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/ 
business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html. 
 32. What Are Guest Services Fees?, AIRBNB, http://www.airbnb.com/help/ 
article/104/what-are-guest-service-fees (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 33. Rob Preston, Digital Disruption: It’s Not What You Think, 
FORBES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2015/04/20/digital 
-disruption-its-not-what-you-think. 
 34. See About DeskWanted, DESKWANTED, https://deskwanted.wordpress 
.com/about (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (describing the service that DeskWanted 
provides and how the company works); Company Profile, REGUS, http://b.regus 
.com/investors/company-profile (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (providing a general 
company profile for investors regarding Regus’s activities). 
 35. 7 Start-Ups Inspired by Craigslist, AABACO SMALL BUS., https://www 
.aabacosmallbusiness.com/advisor/7-start-ups-inspired-craigslist-210000849 
.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 36. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE 
SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/ 
publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf. 
 37. Ellen Huet, Uber Says It’s Doing 1 Million Rides per Day, 140 Million 
in Last Year, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/ 
2014/12/17/uber-says-its-doing-1-million-rides-per-day-140-million-in-last 
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Lyft, the second largest transportation platform company and 
Uber’s competitor, has raised over $500 million in funding and 
has tens of thousands of service-providers in over sixty-five cit-
ies.38 Other platform competitors have been established around 
the world, such as BlaBlaCar, a France-based transportation 
company, which raised $100 million in 2014 and recently ex-
panded into India, its fourteenth market.39 Other new compa-
nies focus on long-distance transportation, such as Tripda, 
while still others focus on servicing particular markets, such as 
universities (Zimride), women (Chariot for Women), and chil-
dren (Kidz Kab). Each of these companies offers a creative take 
on traditional markets and uses a variety of disruptive technol-
ogies to shake up their respective industries. These new trans-
portation businesses match drivers and passengers via 
smartphone technology and sophisticated matching algo-
rithms.40 Unlike taxicabs and limousines, these companies do 
not position themselves as common carriers, and most do not 
seek the regulatory licensing traditionally required for such 
services.41 Uber asserts it is not a taxi business, but rather 
merely an app and network. It argues that it owns no cabs and 
the cab drivers are not employees, but rather independent con-
tractors.42 In public statements, Uber stresses that it “sees it-
self as a technology company” that “connects riders” with inde-
pendent contractors who it considers to be true “high-quality 
transportation providers.”43 The taxicab industry and some 
 
-year; Will Oremus, Silicon Valley Uber Alles, SLATE (June 6, 2014), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/06/uber_17_billion_ 
valuation_it_s_now_worth_nearly_as_much_as_hertz_and_avis.html. 
 38. See Mark Sullivan, Lyft Has Raised a New $530M Round, Reaching a 
Valuation of $3B, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.venturebeat 
.com/2015/03/11/lyft-has-raised-a-new-530m-round-reaching-a-valuation-of-3b-
report. 
 39. Noyan Ayan, BlaBlaCar Expands Beyond Europe, Launches in India, 
WEBRAZZI (Jan. 14, 2015), http://en.webrazzi.com/2015/01/14/blablacar 
-launches-in-india; Lora Kolodny, French Company BlaBlaCar Raises $100M 
To Make Ride-Sharing Easy, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
venturecapital/2014/07/02/french-company-blablacar-raises-100m-to-make 
-ride-sharing-easy. 
 40. Stephanie Francis Ward, ‘App’ Me a Ride: Internet Car Companies 
Offer Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Pay-
off, FORBES (June 10, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/ 
2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-ride-to-riches-the-uber-payoff. 
 43. Ward, supra note 40, at 14. 
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regulators argue otherwise.44 Is Uber one big business? Is each 
driver a small enterprise? Are Uber drivers workers, independ-
ent contractors, or franchisees? 
These questions are far from theoretical. They are acute 
and pervasive. These services are available in over 1000 cities, 
and new models continue to develop rapidly. For example, oth-
er companies—still within transportation—are disrupting the 
car rental industry. Car2Go and ZipCar offer short-term use of 
a smart car in a designated zone.45 DecoBike offers the use of 
bikes throughout the city, and returns at designated locations.46 
Getaround, founded in San Francisco, allows car owners to rent 
out their vehicles.47 While these companies use different levels 
of platform connectivity, they are each presenting innovative 
tools to match physical services with those who need them. Dis-
rupting the service and staffing industry, TaskRabbit, similarly 
founded in San Francisco, allows users to list errands they need 
completed, including handyman jobs and personal assistance.48 
Taskers, the people who have been certified by the site, bid to 
work on the tasks, and TaskRabbit, the company, typically 
takes a fifteen percent to thirty percent fee from the offered 
price.49 Need a dog walker? DogVacay will link you to one.50 
Need a teacher? Skillshare will connect you.51 Need a pro-
grammer to update a Wikipedia entry? Fiverr will find you 
one.52 
Disrupting the restaurant market by directly connecting 
foodies and chefs using digital technologies, EatWith aggre-
gates offerings of secret suppers and pop-up restaurants, host-
ed in an individual’s home or other private spaces, where chefs 
prepare food in a noncommercial kitchen without formal per-
 
 44. Id. 
 45. CAR2GO, https://www.car2go.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016); ZIPCAR, 
http://www.zipcar.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 46. DECOBIKE, supra note 15. 
 47. How It Works, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 48. What Does TaskRabbit Offer?, TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit 
.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411410-What-does-TaskRabbit-Offer (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2016). 
 49. What Is the TaskRabbit Service Fee?, TASKRABBIT, https://support 
.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411610-What-is-the-TaskRabbit-Service 
-Fee (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 50. DOGVACAY, https://www.dogvacay.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 51. SKILLSHARE, https://www.skillshare.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 52. FIVERR, https://www.fiverr.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
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mits of city health and code enforcement officials.53 Some of 
these culinary events are set up through less specialized online 
sites and instead come together using existing social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.54 
Disrupting network broadcasting and cable providers, 
Aereo was a start-up founded in 2012 that allowed subscribers 
to watch and record live TV over the Internet for a monthly 
fee.55 It maintained a bank of miniature, dime-sized antennas 
within each city it operated, and, much like old rabbit ears, 
pulled down local TV signals broadcast over-the-air.56 Every 
time a subscriber wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo as-
signed them an antenna.57 Anticipating the copyright challeng-
es that it would face, Aereo took separate recordings for every 
single person watching and provided the user full control over 
what content they wanted to save and play.58 Despite these ef-
forts to use technological innovation to avoid such a ruling, the 
company went bankrupt when, in 2014, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the digital platform was illegally dis-
rupting the broadcasting industry.59 
The common pattern that emerges is a definitional one. 
Platform companies adamantly endeavor to be defined first and 
foremost by what they are not. These companies are not selling 
the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather, 
they are selling access to the software, the matching algo-
rithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between 
their users.60 In turn, the platform breaks down traditional in-
 
 53. Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, 
Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 17 
(2015) (noting the non-regulated “pop-up” nature of underground dining); Who 
We Are, EATWITH, https://www.eatwith.com/about (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) 
(describing EatWith’s purpose and mode of operation). 
 54. Schindler, supra note 53, at 18. 
 55. Jacob Kastrenakes, Aereo Loses to Broadcasters in Supreme Court 
Fight for Its Life, THE VERGE (June 25, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/ 
6/25/5801052/aereo-supreme-court-ruling. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Aereo, Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by IAC; 
New Technology Platform Allows Consumers Access to Live TV over the Inter-
net, MARKETWIRED (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.marketwired.com/press 
-release/aereo-announces-205m-series-a-financing-led-iac-new-technology 
-platform-allows-consumers-nasdaq-iaci-1619629.htm. 
 59. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files 
-for-bankruptcy.html?_r=0. 
 60. Darcy Allen, What Is a Taxi? Regulation and the Sharing Economy, 
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dustry categorizations and, as a result, presents a challenge 
when labeling the nature of the business by creating an ambig-
uous relationship between the provider and user; employer and 
employee; and owner and consumer. 
Figure 1: Start-Ups & Regulated Corollaries 
Airbnb 
VRBO 
HomeAway 
Hotel 
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ParkingPanda 
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Zipcar Car Rentals 
JustShareIt Car Dealers 
EatWith Restaurants 
TaskRabbit 
AirTasker 
Zaarly 
Manpower Agencies 
DogVaycay Pet Services 
Aereo 
FilmOn Broadcasting/Cable 
B. THE EVERYTHING PLATFORM: CHALLENGING LABELS AS A 
FORM OF INNOVATION 
The staggering rise of online networks and digital service 
companies raises questions about the nature of platform busi-
nesses and how they generate their value; yet, the platform 
economy defies simple definitions. The platform economy is a 
system characterized primarily by what it’s not: conventional 
 
OECD INSIGHTS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.oecdinsights.org/2014/12/22/what 
-is-a-taxi-regulation-and-the-sharing-economy. 
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and static. The most important aspect of the platform economy 
is that it includes an ecology of continuously evolving business 
models. The initial inquiries about their essence and character 
point to the very challenge of classification—we are in unchar-
tered territories, a new zone of economic relations. Law and 
language attempt to chart boundaries, and yet they are inher-
ently limited to covering the existing forms of life and bounds of 
human imagination. Innovation is always disruptive in that 
regard. When it comes to new industries and embryonic busi-
ness models, lawmakers need to tread carefully. Though this 
has always been true, the platform is introducing new models 
and structures of exchange at unprecedented rates. Platform 
companies often have few real assets, and their value is em-
bedded in their technology, user base, and brand. Moreover, 
platform companies can quickly morph and expand, rendering 
this definitional-defiant innovation unstoppable. Consider 
Uber’s ambitions for a moment. Uber recently changed its mot-
to from “[e]veryone’s private driver” to “[w]here lifestyle meets 
logistics.”61 The shift from “driving” to “lifestyle” is telling. 
Uber’s critical mass of users and continuous perfection of its 
software are both opening opportunities for expansion. Why 
stop at rides when it can offer delivery services and carpooling? 
Why stop at cars when the technology it develops is extendable 
to other forms of transportation, such as boats, planes, and, 
eventually, driverless cars? 
This is not a futuristic dream, but instead an emerging re-
ality. Uber has launched a courier delivery service, UberRUSH, 
as well as UberBOAT, a service to request a water taxi around 
harbors, which is currently operating in Boston but soon ex-
panding to Sydney, Australia, and elsewhere (in addition to 
Uber’s boating services, other actors in the platform economy 
are offering flights).62 UberPOOL coordinates individual riders 
who are traveling to similar locations along a similar route.63 If 
there is a match found along the route, the app notifies the rid-
er with their co-rider’s first name.64 Clearly, Uber aspires to be 
 
 61. Adam Vaccaro, Uber Isn’t a Car Service. It’s the Future of Logistics, 
INC. (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.inc.com/adam-vaccaro/uber-isnt-a-car-service 
.html. 
 62. DARCY ALLEN & CHRIS BERG, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, THE SHARING 
ECONOMY: HOW OVER-REGULATION COULD DESTROY AN ECONOMIC REVOLU-
TION 6 (2014), https://www.ipa.org.au/portal/uploads/Sharing_Economy_ 
December_2014.pdf. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. The Public Utilities Commission in California decided that Uber’s 
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the “Everything Platform,” similar to how Amazon morphed 
from a bookstore to the “Everything Store.” In 2015, Uber an-
nounced that it is investing in the research and development of 
self-driving cars.65 Uber also recently announced that it would 
develop its own mapping platform and move away from Google 
Maps.66 At the same time, Google is also realizing the potential 
of what can, in effect, only be described as the “Everything 
Economy” and has announced its own ambition in getting into 
the ride-sharing service game with self-driving cars.67 A new 
venture in Silicon Valley, appropriately called Magic, promises 
to push the platform’s vision of totality further. Magic’s busi-
ness model is its promise to deliver “anything you want (and 
they do mean anything) as long as it’s legal”—a tiger to your 
door, sushi on a boat, or your parking ticket handled.68 The 
company launched in February 2015 and logged 17,000 re-
quests in its first forty-eight hours of operation.69 Magic indeed. 
As the platform continues to morph and expand, the dis-
ruption of conventional business models, definitional bounda-
ries, and doctrinal order will swell.70 A recent PwC report calls 
companies to audit all tangible and intangible assets that could 
potentially be profitably introduced into the platform, including 
energy, telecoms, and retailing.71 As it continues to grow, the 
platform can be best understood as clusters of market develop-
ments—driven by network technology—that continuously dis-
 
new carpooling service is illegal because two distinct riders pay separate fares 
to share one car. Mark Rogowsky, California Threatens To Shut Down Uber’s 
New Carpooling Service, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
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Build Self-Driving Cars, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.techcrunch 
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-self-driving-cars. 
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SLATE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/02/ 
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.html. 
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thing—If You’re Willing To Pay for It, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2015), https:// 
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 69. Id. 
 70. See infra Figure 2. 
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rupt previous notions of economies of production, consumption, 
finance, knowledge, and education. The potential, as well as the 
peril, of such an amorphous beast is at the core of the regulato-
ry pushbacks it is encountering, and even more fundamentally, 
the binary accounts of its utopian or dystopian nature. 
Figure 2: Fifty Ways to Look at the Platform 
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Categories 
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Regulated industry 
Employer – Employee 
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App 
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C. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY: ROMANTIC UTOPIA OR 
NIGHTMARE DYSTOPIA? 
The realities of the recent cycles of financial crises and 
economic restructuring, together with advances in digital tech-
nology and shifts in lifestyle, have created the perfect storm for 
the platform economy. The reasons for the rise of the platform 
economy are key to analyzing the contemporary challenges pre-
sented by existing regulations and the normative questions 
about law’s continued role. Contemporary debates, however, 
fail to reflect this complexity. One of the striking dimensions of 
public debates about the platform is the strong, bipolar descrip-
tions of its revolutionary potential. These descriptions are 
largely raised with broad brushstrokes and absolute terms, ei-
ther hailing the platform as the anti-corporate utopian answer 
to twentieth-century discontentment or an accelerated path to 
further injustice and inequality. While many celebrate the plat-
form’s potential to positively transform capitalism into some-
thing kinder and fairer, others view that transformation as 
dangerous to work relations, consumer welfare, distributive 
justice, and regulatory compliance. Proponents romantically 
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envision the platform as a return to the days free from corpo-
rate dominance, when interactions happened directly and inti-
mately between individuals, when design was bottom-up and 
relationships were based on community rather than markets.72 
For opponents, it is a dystopian uber-capitalist development in 
which every interaction becomes the basis of market exchanges, 
privacy and leisure are lost, and Silicon Valley style-
libertarians become richer at the expense of everyone else.73 
Many commentators decry that “regulatory mechanisms 
have not kept pace”74 and consumers are hurt as platform busi-
nesses avoid established regulations and “typically operate out-
side them.”75 Most of all, some assert that platforms do not 
simply rise by avoiding regulatory compliance, but that growth 
is instead directly linked to the desire of businesses to avoid the 
laws and economic practices designed to enhance employee wel-
fare, such as long-term employment, liability and insurance, 
and product quality control, all of which create the bedrock of 
twentieth century business practices. For example, progressive 
economist Dean Baker views the platform as “largely based on 
evading regulations and breaking the law,” subjecting consum-
ers to substandard, and often unsafe, products and services.76 
Speaking directly to the utopian/dystopian duality, Anthony 
Kalamar has coined the term “sharewashing,” in which plat-
form companies, under the guise of the misleading term “shar-
ing economy,” shift liability and risk onto employees and con-
sumers.77 Others similarly contend, “There is little doubt that 
 
 72. See, e.g., Rosie Neve, A Sharing Community: It Takes a Village, INDE-
PENDENT (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and 
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www.salon.com/2015/04/12/rise_of_the_techno_libertarians_the_5_most_ 
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ing the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J., Spring 2014, at 6. 
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the pro-sharing discourse is blind to the dark side of these in-
novations.”78 The contrasting voices, celebrating or denouncing 
the rise of the platform, are difficult to reconcile. At the same 
time, a consensus emerges from the heated debate: a paradig-
matic shift is underway and its costs, benefits, and legal impli-
cations are still unsettled. 
II.  PRINCIPLES OF THE PLATFORM   
A. TRANSACTION COSTS REVOLUTION 
Can this new set of marketplaces continue to make admirable profits 
while enabling the casual owner to monetize possessions or skills that 
were otherwise collecting dust? –Mike Jones, Forbes79 
In 1960, R.H. Coase first wrote about the inherent ineffi-
ciencies in the market, sourced in the high transaction costs 
incurred throughout the stages of a deal: “[O]perations are of-
ten extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent 
many transactions that would be carried out in a world in 
which the pricing system worked without cost.”80 Transaction 
costs include search and information costs for who and what to 
deal with; negotiation and decision costs, which include bar-
gaining for the terms of the deal, reaching an agreed upon 
price, and drafting the contract; and monitoring and compli-
ance costs necessary for successfully carrying out the terms of 
the deal.81 In other words, transaction costs can be classified 
into three categories that correlate with the three stages of pre-
deal, deal-making, and post-deal: (1) search costs; (2) bargain-
ing and decision costs; and (3) policing and enforcement costs.82 
Each stage relies on information to reduce costs. The platform, 
which increases connectivity, access to information, and the 
application of advanced technology to every aspect of a deal, 
impacts the relevant transaction costs at all three stages. As 
 
 78. JULIET SCHOR, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, DEBATING THE SHAR-
ING ECONOMY 11 (2014). 
 79. Mike Jones, How Capitalism and Regulation Will Reshape the Shar-
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 81. Id. at 15; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The 
Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 549 (1981). 
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the platform grows, efficiencies grow as well. In a systemic 
way, the market, quite simply, is perfecting. 
The platform is driven first and foremost by a combination 
of technological advancements. In less than a decade, total In-
ternet access has grown by over 500 percent.83 Most American 
consumers have at least one mobile device with access to high-
speed networks, GPS, and smart apps. Most of the Western 
world now has Internet access, and the developing world is rap-
idly gaining access as well. Analysts predict 50 billion mobile 
wireless devices will connect to the Internet by 2020.84 With 
more users, as well as enhanced matching algorithms, pricing 
software, resource division to tailor each deal, and data mining 
to monitor the exchange, transaction costs are reduced dramat-
ically. 
This Section presents ten fundamental principles of the 
platform economy. They include the shift from ownership to 
access (proprietas to usus), the monetization of excess, the re-
duction of overhead, and the extension of the life cycle of prod-
ucts. These principles also include the dynamic use of pricing 
algorithms and rating data. A platform company need not em-
body all ten principles but as a general matter, these principles 
represent the revolutionary nature that characterizes the plat-
form. As will be described in Part II.B, beyond the platform’s 
efficiency enhancing principles, the rise of the platform econo-
my is also driven by shifting preferences, including an in-
creased desire for choice and variety, an authentic experience, 
the reduction of one’s carbon footprint, and a general anti-
corporate sentiment. Whether the platform actually offers what 
it sells is, at least in part, separate and distinct from the ques-
tion of what it is selling: a lifestyle filled with authentic unique 
experiences, responsible green consumption, social connectivi-
ty, and consumer empowerment. 
1. Economies of Scale 
In the industrial era, corporate structures allowed markets 
to scale. The scale of informal exchanges was small and left un-
regulated. As platform companies enter to compete with estab-
lished industries, they are increasingly taking a lion’s share of 
their anti-industry. Perhaps counterintuitively, the rise in 
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wireless technology and the expansion of online connectivity 
has allowed a return, in some ways, to the pre-industrial vil-
lage—bartering, sharing, and other direct individual-to-
individual monetized exchanges. Despite this retro feel, howev-
er, the platform village is nothing like the physical village. Ra-
ther, platform companies connect strangers on a highly intense 
global scale. That potential to connect users all around the 
world digitally is unprecedented. 
2. No More Waste 
A key principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to 
work. The platform enables a more efficient use of private re-
sources. People shelve most assets for the majority of the time 
they own that product. Cars are driven less than eight percent 
of the day.85 The lawn mower is used once every two weeks. The 
spare bedroom is occupied only twice a year when the in-laws 
visit. Still on the supply side, with downturns in the labor mar-
ket and high unemployment rates, many seek to fill up their 
free time and leverage their flexibility to earn extra income. In 
other words, the platform resurrects dormant capital—be it 
tangible products or human capital.86 This includes dormant 
labor capacity both in the form of downtime and as skills people 
have but could not previously monetize. Many people are good 
cooks, handymen, home-designers, computer whizzes, artists, 
or writers but do not use those skills professionally. The plat-
form economy gives people who have developed a skill unrelat-
ed to their main source of income the ability to commercialize 
that skill. In other words, supply is increased by adding under-
utilized assets into the market and, in turn, costs are reduced. 
3. Tailoring the Transactional Unit 
Platforms are also ushering the end of idle capacity by al-
lowing users to slice up time and space into smaller units. The 
platform breaks down both supply and demand into tiny modal-
ities: short-term rentals, a few minutes of personal assistance, 
a couple of hours of furniture installation, or an evening a week 
enjoying an amateur chef ’s dinner at her private home. There 
 
 85. See Paul Barter, “Cars Are Parked 95% of the Time.” Let’s Check!, RE-
INVENTING PARKING (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.reinventingparking.org/2013/ 
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is efficiency in renting a car for an hour rather than for a day; 
in crashing on someone’s couch rather than getting your own 
hotel room; and in renting a house together with two other fam-
ilies instead of three suites at an established resort. Digital 
technology facilitates these smaller exchanges, a feature Yochai 
Benkler has termed “granularity,”87 which would otherwise be 
impossible without instantaneous communication among mil-
lions of individuals. The platform allows services and products 
to be rented out by the minute, resulting in an extremely small 
transactional unit. 
4. We Are All Capitalists Now 
Sharing is growing exponentially, but it is not free. True, 
the platform offers bartering (Babysitting Co-ops), gifting 
(Freecycle and Kashless), and swapping (thredUP and 
SwapTree) options, but even those exchanges formalize and 
systemically record previously informal exchanges. The lion’s 
share of exchanges on the platform, however, is based on the 
price of renting, trading, servicing, and lending. In fact, in 
many ways, the platform tilts the balance away from altruis-
tic/communal interactions to marketable/commodified exchang-
es. Imagine the monetization of everything. From a Coasean 
transaction cost perspective, quite intuitively, uber-
capitalization is another way in which supply increases, result-
ing in reduced costs for consumers. At the same time, there are, 
of course, costs to monetizing everything: your leisure time, 
your friendships, and your private home. The platform takes 
the saying that everything, and everyone, has a price quite lit-
erally. 
5. From Prêt-à-Porter to the People’s Haute Couture 
In the wake of several economic downturns, consumers are 
demanding more competitive prices and smaller packaging of 
their services. They are also demanding more input into the 
metrics of what they consume. The platform promises to end 
the conflict between non-tailored supply and specific demands. 
As offerings become extremely disaggregated, consumers can 
find exactly what they were looking for: renting a non-smoking, 
pet-friendly, Kosher, and partly furnished apartment for three 
nights in a specific neighborhood, with specified features, and 
 
 87. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUC-
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 100 (2006). 
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at a specific cost. In other words, the platform facilitates better 
customization of the terms and conditions of the transaction to 
fit individual needs with a new degree of specificity. 
6. Access over Ownership 
Zero waste and the resurrection of dead capital are achiev-
able because consumption culture has shifted from being domi-
nated by acquisition into a mindset of access. Owning a car is 
not as important as the ability to use one when needed. Con-
sumers don’t feel a need to purchase the lawn mower, and are 
instead satisfied just knowing that one is there when the grass 
has grown. In particular, as population density and urbaniza-
tion continue to rise, congestion and smaller spaces push con-
sumers to place access above ownership. This shift from owner-
ship to access further reduces transaction costs by reducing the 
stakes of the deal. Purchasing an annual membership in a car 
sharing platform is not as weighty of a deal as buying a car, 
and purchasing use of a car for an hour is not as costly as rent-
ing it for a day. 
7. Less Overhead 
The platform has further decentralized transactions by re-
ducing intermediation. No more middleman, besides—of 
course—the platform. Direct exchanges between private indi-
viduals are not new, but they are happening on an unprece-
dented scale. Technology allows private parties to coordinate 
directly without the need of anything beyond the software. As 
described in Part I, while the business models of platform com-
panies vary significantly, many platform companies charge 
around fifteen percent for each transaction they facilitate. This 
overhead is far smaller than when off-line companies offer simi-
lar services in their respective industries. Online companies 
have far fewer expenses than their off-line counterparts: they 
do not own the assets they broker or employ the people who 
exchange their labor. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the ques-
tion of cost is inextricably tied to the question of regulation. 
Costs inevitably increase if, for example, Uber is legally 
deemed to be an employer of all the drivers it connects to pas-
sengers. 
8. Reduced Barriers to Entry 
The platform economy encourages new entrants into indus-
tries long entrenched with incumbents. Due to the reduction in 
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overhead, start-up costs to compete digitally are low. All you 
need is a domain name and website. By providing marketplaces 
of programmers, the platform has also lowered even these min-
imal setup costs. At the same time, the platform’s reliance on 
scale and trust creates first mover and mass-scale advantages 
for some, which suggests that we might witness recentraliza-
tion, even as the platform allows decentralization.88 Even more 
importantly, there are virtually zero start-up costs to become a 
user/provider, essentially a micro-entrepreneur, on one of the 
existing platforms. Thus, the platform is fundamentally chang-
ing the way we exchange and interact as market actors. If you 
want to test out your abilities as a chef or a bed and breakfast 
host, you simply list your services on an existing platform and 
wait for an offer. 
9. Pricing Precision 
When it was first founded, Airbnb realized that choosing a 
price was the most difficult stage in the listing process for pri-
vate hosts. Now Airbnb uses a sophisticated series of algo-
rithms to suggest pricing. It developed a model for providing 
dynamically tailored price recommendations based on location, 
likeness to other properties, and time of the year.89 The model 
takes into account variables like the temperature at any given 
time as a proxy for seasonality.90 Similarly, Uber prices rides 
dynamically, offering discounts when demand is lower while 
raising prices in peak hours.91 Uber’s “dynamic” or “surge” pric-
ing model adjusts to increase driver efficiency, which gives 
more incentives for supply when demand is high.92 These so-
phisticated pricing algorithms, which continue to evolve 
through systemic learning, allow for a more accurate valuation 
of goods and services, and reduce both negotiation and uncer-
tainty costs in striking the deal. 
 
 88. Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, 
and Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1470 (2014). This is partly why Uber, 
Airbnb, and other major players appear to be pushing for being taxed, as they 
now become wary of newcomers. See infra Part III. 
 89. ALLEN & BERG, supra note 62, at 21. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Rafi Mohammed, Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 9, 2014), https://www.hbr.org/2014/07/regulation-is 
-hurting-cabs-and-helping-uber. 
 92. Dan Hill, OpenAir: Algorithmic Pricing, AIRBNB (May 7, 2014), http:// 
nerds.airbnb.com/openair-algorithmic-pricing. On the controversies surround-
ing Uber surge pricing, see infra Part III.B.3. 
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10. Dynamic Information 
Asymmetrical access to information greatly increases 
transaction costs. Consumers do not know the quality of the 
experience they are paying for until they consume it; individu-
als are not familiar with the service they paid for until after 
they complete the transaction. Platforms combat this by offer-
ing dynamic ratings, reviews, and information, which reduce 
uncertainty and strengthen consumer confidence. It also reduc-
es monitoring costs as the certainty that one will receive a bad 
review creates ex ante incentives to comply with the terms of 
the deal. As will be discussed at more length in Part IV, the 
same technological factors that dramatically reduce transaction 
costs of search and negotiation also enable dynamic quality 
monitoring, transparency, record-keeping, and data-mining 
that reduce information asymmetry between providers and 
consumers, building confidence in the deal. This confidence in-
creases over time as interlocking networks in the platform ma-
ture. 
B. MARKET CHALLENGING OR MARKET CREATING? 
In large part, the battle over definitions, boundaries, and 
regulation depends on understanding the economic logic of the 
platform. Are new platform companies successfully competing 
within established, regulated industries because they are in-
troducing new business models and creating a substantively 
different economic transaction, or because they seek regulatory 
avoidance and generate value from such avoidance? Even if 
they do not actively avoid regulations, the answer to whether to 
extend existing regulations to the platform depends on whether 
these new companies are, at their core, essentially similar to 
the industries they disrupt. In other words, even when we rec-
ognize the economic logic of reducing transaction costs as the 
core essence of the rise of the platform, we still need to answer 
whether a platform company is either competing within an ex-
isting industry or carving out a new market. To this end, it is 
important to recognize the difference between market competi-
tion and market differentiation. Adding to the complexity of the 
regulation-innovation nexus at the heart of the platform econ-
omy is the fact that the platform is doing both: perfecting and 
changing existing markets, as well as creating new ones. 
In economics, “differentiation,” or “dynamic competition,” 
refers to ways in which businesses compete, not simply over 
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pricing, but over the kind of services and products offered.93 The 
platform offers new experiences and shapes new preferences. 
Take, for example, Uber and Lyft. At Uber, drivers add ameni-
ties to their cars, such as bottled water, tissues, or hard candy. 
The transactions are cashless and tip-less,94 which is not only 
meant to ensure convenience but also a sense of safety—and 
perhaps a sense of trust and social connection by partially ob-
scuring the monetary aspect of the exchange. In lifestyle con-
sumption, such small differences matter and can modify the 
experience. At Lyft, passengers ride shotgun with the drivers, 
communicating a message of both parity and community inclu-
sion. Ride-hailing platform companies also compete with ride-
sharing apps, in which people join drivers on their way to a 
shared destination, which is even further along on the differen-
tiation spectrum. This latter experience is one more akin to 
carpooling, even if it is mediated through the platform and car-
ries a price tag. The use of this platform to facilitate transac-
tions is not only about saving money, but also carries the mean-
ing of the environmentally responsible practice of reducing the 
number of cars on the road. 
Lifestyle and social meaning are important to the platform. 
At the broadest level, the matching system provides a sense of 
community, which maps onto a contemporary anti-corporatist 
sentiment. People value the idea of paying the provider direct-
ly, even if the platform takes a cut: “[n]o matter how well 
trained service employees might be, everyone is nicer when 
they’re dealing with customers directly. Even customers. Near-
ly everyone who stays at an Airbnb rental, for instance, hangs 
up their bathroom towels after they use them.”95 
The distinct experience of exchange through the platform 
is significant if it changes the nature of the transaction, rather 
than simply adding a competitor to the existing market. The 
societal factors for the rise of the platform economy are multi-
ple. Consumers convey a preference for a different kind of mar-
 
 93. Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive 
Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 60, 64 (1997). 
 94. As a result of the class action lawsuits against Uber by drivers who 
claimed among other things that Uber violated state law by not transferring to 
them tips which users believed were included in the transportation fare, Uber 
now allows drivers in Massachusetts and California to post signs saying tips 
are appreciated. See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, To Tip or Not To Tip Your 
Uber Driver, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/ 
travel/uber-taxi-tipping.html?_r=0. 
 95. Stein, supra note 18. 
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ket exchange. For example, the rise of lodging platforms such 
as VRBO, Homeaway, and Airbnb can be linked to a sense of 
adventure in renting a home directly from its owner, rather 
than staying at a generic hotel chain. Foodies enjoy the idea of 
eating at the private home of an aspiring chef and being the 
first to discover the “new, new thing.” The fact that consumers 
are choosing with their feet and reporting a preference for the 
choices presented by platform companies is evident by the 
sheer number of users.96 
At the same time, the choices and preferences are them-
selves formed by the embedding of the platform into our every-
day life. Consider Airbnb. Studies find that consumers who use 
Airbnb stay on vacation longer than they would if they stayed 
at a hotel, and some guests would not have gone on a vacation 
at all without access to the lodging platform.97 Airbnb commis-
sioned a study that found that Airbnb rentals are cheaper than 
hotels, leading people vacationing in California to stay longer 
and spend on average thirty-one percent more than hotel 
guests.98 The study also found that fourteen percent of custom-
ers would not have visited San Francisco at all if an Airbnb 
stay was unavailable.99 In other words, the platform incited 
their consumption rather than merely providing an alternative 
brand within an existing consumer market. Similarly, the plat-
form may go beyond fostering affordability and actually legiti-
mize hiring a personal assistant, dog walker, driver, tutor, or 
personal chef; purchases that would otherwise seem awkward 
and unseemly to many people in an offline world. Web 3.0 is 
transforming the lifestyle of the masses, rather than simply 
facilitating better matches for a static equilibrium of supply 
and demand. The platform is generating a different set of pref-
erences and thereby reconfiguring markets. 
The behavioral aspects and preference formation in the 
platform can help explain the variance in the level of pushback 
 
 96. Matthew Mitchell, An Uber Challenge to Tacky Taxis, WASH. TIMES 
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/28/an-uber 
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Study, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/ 
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 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
  
2016] LAW OF THE PLATFORM 115 
 
from established industries reacting to different platform dis-
ruptions. Juxtaposing the taxi industry for ride-sharing, and 
the hotel industry for home-sharing, the hotel industry has 
been much less averse to Airbnb compared to the taxi indus-
try’s reaction to Uber/Lyft.100 At least in part, the difference can 
be explained by the elasticity in each of the markets, and 
whether the platform presents direct competition. In general, 
Airbnb competes more directly with bargain and boutique in-
dependent hotels, while luxury hotels and bigger hotel chains, 
which cater to business clients, are less affected. A recent study 
examining the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry finds only 
a small, statistically insignificant negative effect of Airbnb on 
upscale hotels.101 The study concludes that “[Airbnb’s] impact is 
non-uniformly distributed, with lower-priced hotels, and those 
hotels not catering to business travelers being the most affect-
ed” segments and that affected hotels have responded by reduc-
ing prices, “an impact that benefits all consumers, not just par-
ticipants in the sharing economy.”102 
At the same time, as we saw above, Airbnb is also changing 
consumption patterns more fundamentally, helping consumers 
imagine their dream vacations, plan trips that would not oth-
erwise be planned, and stay longer at new cities. Indeed, the 
paradigmatic shift enabled by the platform, from ownership to 
access, maps onto contemporary social psychology research 
showing that expenditures on experiences result in greater 
happiness than purchases of tangible goods.103 These changing 
patterns of experience consumption are endogenous to the rise 
of the platform economy and can help explain how business 
models such as Airbnb and Uber disrupt more than one indus-
try. They reconfigure a range of industries by altering basic 
patterns of supply and demand and shifting incentives previ-
ously associated with traditional purchasing decisions. Rather 
than simply competing with the hotel industry, Airbnb inter-
 
 100. Joe Kutura, Why the Hotel Industry Doesn’t Really Mind Airbnb, 
PULSEPOINT (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.create.pulsepoint.com/article/ 
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venes in the hotel and real estate industries, rentals, and titles 
in ways that shift the balance between these related industries. 
The same holds true with Uber. It is creating disruption across 
the taxi, car rental, and car seller markets. 
Experiences in the platform are tailored and frequently 
emphasize lifestyle. The platform, especially as it is still form-
ing, often has the appeal of offering exclusive, hip, edgy, excit-
ing, and unusual experiences, while—ironically—also providing 
a sense of community, openness, and bottom-up expansion.104 
The anti-corporate, anti-ownership streak provides ephemeral 
value to consumers, further helping explain the rapid rise of 
the platform. People view platform companies as positively af-
fecting anti-competitive forces: a rejection of corporate concen-
tration, an anti-establishment, underground, or fringe experi-
ence. No doubt, as the platform grows, much of it will become 
mainstream, and concentration will happen in the digital world 
as well. Moreover, again paradoxically, the anti-corporate 
streak also has, in some platform exchanges, an elitist under-
tone. A secret (and pricey) non-restaurant culinary dining 
event set up through the platform can be characterized as 
skyboxification—grunge for the rich.105 Still, platform compa-
nies position themselves as experiential, de-centralized, pro-
amateur, and crowd-based. There is an overarching ethos of 
newness, innovation, and empowerment. 
This play between exclusive and for-the-masses, amateur 
and professional, retro and new are all at the core of what the 
platform is selling. Whether or not any one descriptive feature 
reflects the realities of platform companies is not insignificant, 
but it is not the whole inquiry. The consumption experience it-
self matters. Moreover, the realities of the platform economy 
will continue to be shaped, in part, by how closely governments 
regulate them in relation to regulated industry competitors. In 
other words, the framework itself is unstable and normatively 
dependent on the answers we provide as legal theorists and 
policymakers. 
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III.  CONTESTED GROUNDS OF THE PLATFORM: OWN NO 
EVIL, EMPLOY NO EVIL, DIRECT NO EVIL   
A. LAW AS ENABLER AND INHIBITOR 
Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been fueled by outdated reg-
ulation. –Rafi Mohammed, Harvard Business Review106 
There were laws created for businesses, and there were laws for peo-
ple. What the sharing economy did was create a third category: peo-
ple as businesses. –Brian Chesky, co-founder, Airbnb107 
Some are sad. And some are glad. And some are very, very bad. –Dr. 
Seuss108 
It is an age-old debate. Does law aid or hinder innovation? 
New technologies present new opportunities and new challeng-
es for regulation. The rise of the platform adds new types of 
risk, implicating liability laws, consumer protection laws, in-
surance laws, employment and labor laws, and property and 
zoning laws. But they also provide new ways to address some of 
the very same social goals that law has attempted to reach. We 
are accustomed to thinking in terms of a new industry followed 
by a new set of regulations, but market innovation also offers 
an opportunity for more foundational thinking about the role of 
regulation. New economic models push for new legal processes. 
The platform economy has introduced innovation in services, 
entrepreneurship, and the way we work. When manufacturing 
rose in the industrial era, New Dealers added new regulations, 
such as safety standards for the auto industry. During the era 
of the Great Society, trans-industry agencies including OSHA 
and the EPA were formed, introducing further regulations, of-
ten built on and adopted from industry self-standards.109 In cy-
cles of both financial crisis and technological leaps, markets 
readjust, new types of transactions are introduced, and in turn 
new forms of regulation are adopted. Even beyond external 
economic and social forces, in considering the law as a more 
closed system, scholars have observed repeated internal cyclical 
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conversions between over- and under-regulation, especially 
when disruptive business models are introduced.110 
The goals of regulation are multiple. Regulation can in-
volve correction of market failures and incentivization of com-
petition. Regulation can be designed to address public safety, 
quality control, privacy, access, equality, fairness, and distribu-
tional concerns. All regulations are presumed to enhance the 
public welfare, but a realistic understanding of regulation in 
action is that not all regulation is equally situated in this re-
gard. Public choice theory and regulatory capture help explain 
barriers to entry that do not contribute to overall welfare.111 
Other regulations are simply outdated, and based on incorrect 
economic and scientific presumptions, or their goals are other-
wise achievable through more efficient and accurate means. 
The regulatory questions raised by the rapid rise of the 
platform are expansive. They span the entire map of the legal 
world, including work, tax, safety and health, quality and con-
sumer protection, intellectual property, zoning, and anti-
discrimination. The following Section identifies clusters of 
regulatory logic. The platform economy pushes us to look at the 
world of regulation with fresh eyes and to analyze regulatory 
requirements with these categories in mind. Laws that do not 
promote welfare but rather protect entrenched interests are 
easy cases. On this end of the spectrum, the Article identifies 
many permitting and licensing laws as well as price controls. 
Tax laws are a similarly easy case because these laws continue 
along the same logic as in the pre-platform offline market. The 
hardest cases are regulations that are about fairness, externali-
ties, and normative preferences in a democratic process. These 
include consumer protection laws, quality and safety controls, 
zoning laws, employment laws, and intellectual property laws. 
B. EASY CASES: COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
The traditional way is you can’t do it unless you get a license. That 
made sense up until we had data. Now the starting point is yes. 
–Nick Grossman, Union Square Ventures112 
1. Permitting 
There are regulations that enhance public welfare and 
there are those that enhance the interests of lobbyists, rent-
 
 110. See id. at 367. 
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seekers, and entrenched interests.113 In the transportation 
market, the taxi industry has claimed that Uber, Lyft, and oth-
er transportation platform companies circumvent the regula-
tions and licensing fees with which taxicab companies must 
contend. In February 2015, the Broward County Commission in 
Florida voted to regulate ride-sharing services the same way 
taxis are regulated.114 As a result, Uber and Lyft will be re-
quired to obtain the same certificates as taxis and limousines.115 
In 2014, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission held sep-
arate hearings for Lyft and Uber to decide whether the compa-
nies should be granted permanent licenses to operate 
statewide.116 Similar hearings are underway around the country 
and across the world. In other states, like Texas, Uber and oth-
er ride-sharing services have been essentially shut out by rules 
governing limo services that restrict charging riders based on 
time elapsed or distance traveled.117 
At the federal level, Senate Bill 1457 was introduced by 
Senator Wayne Fontana in 2014 to create a new category of a 
transportation company, offering legal status for ride-sharing 
companies.118 Such an effort rejects the application of the strin-
gent permitting requirements imposed on traditional transpor-
tation industries and looks at the platform as a new emerging 
market. Similarly, in California, the Public Utilities Commis-
sion reached an agreement to allow ride-sharing companies to 
operate while it weighs proposals that would make them full-
fledged, legally operating “transportation network compa-
 
 113. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
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nies.”119 This new category would not be regulated identically to 
taxis but rather would likely involve state licensing, required 
criminal background checks on drivers, and mandatory insur-
ance coverage more stringent than that required of limo com-
panies. In general, Uber is encouraged in some jurisdictions, 
including California, Oregon, and Washington, but was initially 
banned in Nevada, Boise, Brussels, and Berlin, followed by a 
nationwide ban in Germany.120 
Attempts at extending permit requirements—what indus-
try interests often call “leveling the playing field” between ride-
sharing companies and taxi companies, or between other plat-
form companies and the businesses they disrupt—are generally 
harmful to the evolution of the platform and to competitive 
markets more broadly. Under capture theory, industry players 
extract rent from special permitting, licensing, and other regu-
latory requirements.121 By designing around these regulatory 
rents, platform businesses create value for consumers as well 
as push incumbents to become more efficient and responsive in 
novel ways. Requiring taxicab medallions is a paradigmatic ex-
ample of rents. Here is a striking statistic: in the mid-2000s, 
there were only 12,779 licensed taxicabs in New York City 
compared with 21,000 in 1931 when the city had a million few-
er inhabitants.122 Limited grants of permits, especially coupled 
with regulations such as all transportation cars having to be of 
the same color (yellow cabs), dramatically reduce incentives 
and access to compete. While consumers largely benefit from 
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requiring platform transportation companies to have similar 
safety and insurance standards as taxis, the same is not true 
about restrictions on prices, routes, and entry.123 Instead of 
permitting, regulators should consider direct regulation of the 
benefits. This is the model that California regulators seem to be 
following.124 If risk reduction is the underlying reason for per-
mit requirements, then technology companies could be deemed 
liable for accidents and therefore required to provide insurance. 
As we shall see, there are many other paths to directly increase 
safety without imposing permit requirements. 
2. Occupational Licensing 
A few decades ago, only five percent of jobs required a li-
cense.125 Now nearly one-third of all jobs require some sort of 
licensing. Some professional services were historically subject 
to licensing, such as the law bar and medical boards.126 More 
recently, occupational licensing has been extended to such low-
skill jobs as hairdressers, manicurists, and restaurant workers. 
As one group of economists have recently stated: “Occupational 
licensing has been abused by incumbent market participants to 
exclude rivals, often in unreasonable ways, and to raise prices. 
This disturbing trend already costs consumers billions of dol-
lars every year and impedes job growth . . . .”127 
In July 2015, the White House issued a report prepared by 
the Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, the 
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor 
regarding occupational licensing.128 The report similarly notes 
that “[m]ore than one-quarter of U.S. workers now require a 
 
 123. Taxi Competition, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS. (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results? 
SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7; see also Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit 
Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Admin-
istrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 232 (2014) (suggesting that the paperwork 
and permitting that seem appropriate for a large-scale, centralized business 
focused on taxi services are a mismatch with the compliance capabilities of 
individual drivers, proposing instead that general permits might be a useful 
model, lowering compliance costs while minimizing the harm to the public). 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 119–23. 
 125. Stein, supra note 18. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 2, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2014) (No. 13-
534). 
 128. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCU-
PATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (2015), https://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf. 
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license to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed by 
the States.”129 The report warns that while some licensing is 
designed to provide safety and professionalism, 
The current licensing regime in the United States also creates sub-
stantial costs, and often the requirements for obtaining a license are 
not in sync with the skills needed for the job. There is evidence that 
licensing requirements raise the price of goods and services, restrict 
employment opportunities, and make it more difficult for workers to 
take their skills across State lines. Too often, policymakers do not 
carefully weigh these costs and benefits when making decisions about 
whether or how to regulate a profession through licensing.130 
The effects of the accelerated rise in occupational licensing 
to jobs traditionally open to all workers are anti-competitive 
and regressive, which negatively impact new entry.131 Permit-
ting and licensing requirements, price controls, and threshold 
entry standards are all ex-ante barriers.132 Like with permit-
ting, ex-post regulations that directly address safety and liabil-
ity are generally preferable and more conducive to new entry. 
Ex-post regulations include insurance systems and tort and 
product liability laws. 
3. Rate Fixing 
In February 2015, the City of Orlando passed an ordinance 
requiring ride-sharing companies to charge the same rate as 
taxis, $2.40 a mile.133 In general, taxicabs are regulated not only 
through medallion licensing requirements, which are expensive 
and hard to get, but also by the rates taxis may charge passen-
gers.134 
 
 129. Id. at 3. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Veronique de Rugy, Occupational Licensing: Bad for Competition, Bad 
for Low-Income Workers, MERCATUS CTR., GEO. MASON U. (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.mercatus.org/publication/occupational-licensing-bad-competition 
-bad-low-income-workers. 
 132. See Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need To Regu-
late the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/ 
10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the 
-sharing-economy (discussing new models of regulation that developed out of 
the electronic marketplace). 
 133. Stephen Hudak, Uber Vows To Pay Drivers’ Fines as Orlando Regula-
tions Kick In, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.orlandosentinel 
.com/news/breaking-news/os-uber-orlando-fight-20150202-story.html (noting 
that Uber has said that it will pay fines of drivers in Orlando). 
 134. Mohammed, supra note 91 (“Local governments need to understand 
that consumers view ride sharing services like Uber as close substitutes to 
taxis. Regulators are doing its residents an injustice by regulating taxi prices 
(consumers would benefit from a taxi vs. Uber price war)—and in the process 
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A great innovation of the platform, achieved primarily by 
technological advancement, is accuracy in linking pricing to 
supply and demand. As a recent article in the MIT Technology 
Review argues, “Dynamic pricing is the future, even if the road 
to get there will be bumpy.”135 Uber’s dynamic pricing, though 
received with hostility by the media, is designed for more than 
maximizing profits in the face of increased demand, which most 
companies, for example the airline industry, do in the face of 
fixed supply.136 Rather, because of the nature of the platform, 
Uber’s surge pricing also operates to increase supply: more 
drivers turn on their Uber app when they see that the rates 
have increased. Uber reports that supply of drivers increases 
by seventy to eighty percent when surge pricing is introduced, 
and more importantly, it eliminates two-thirds of unfulfilled 
requests, which demonstrates the magic of the platform econo-
my: supply, as well as demand, is highly elastic.137 This is a 
fundamentally responsive market-perfecting model: 
Dynamic pricing changes are driven algorithmically when wait times 
are increasing dramatically, and “unfulfilled requests” start to rise. In 
essence, there are two functions of the increased price model. One is 
to increase supply. The second function of the price increase is to 
temporarily intentionally reduce demand. Through these two mecha-
nisms, the company is able to (a) increase supply, (b) assure reliabil-
ity, a key tenet of the company, and (c) maximize the number of com-
pleted rides.138 
While economically sound, the technological innovation of 
dynamic pricing is nonetheless largely in tension with regula-
tory schemes. Many states have anti-gouging laws that prevent 
sellers of goods or services from raising prices during times of 
increased demand, such as after a natural disaster. California 
limits price increases by retailers after an emergency to ten 
percent. The goal of anti-gouging laws in this case is to create 
fairness during times of extreme strife. But when the goal is 
simply to subvert the market effects of short-term volatility in 
 
unwittingly fueling Uber’s growth and enriching its stockholders.”). 
 135. James Surowiecki, In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/529961/in-praise-of 
-efficient-price-gouging. 
 136. Id. (explaining that airlines’ fixed supply led them to institute dynam-
ic pricing that encouraged patrons to book early). 
 137. Bill Gurley, A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model, ABOVE 
THE CROWD (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.abovethecrowd.com/2014/03/11/a 
-deeper-look-at-ubers-dynamic-pricing-model. 
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supply and demand, anti-gouging laws are distortive and coun-
ter-productive. 
4. Tax Collection 
A primary concern of local regulators involves whether the 
platform economy should be taxed at the same levels as com-
peting industries. A central issue for Airbnb has been the ques-
tion of hotel tax. Airbnb recently paid $25 million in hotel taxes 
to the city of San Francisco as backpay to account for the past 
several years.139 Other cities have started to demand rent-
sharing hosts pay taxes.140 For example, New York and Portland 
require people who rent their homes to add local hotel taxes to 
visitors’ bills.141 San Diego requires anyone who owns, operates, 
or manages rental properties to charge rental unit business 
taxes. This includes hotels, motels, and any property that is 
advertised or rented during the calendar year.142 
Airbnb claims that it benefits cities in multiple ways. First, 
Airbnb claims it can collect millions in hotel occupancy taxes 
this year, and the number would continue to increase each 
year. Moreover, Airbnb claims that the platform generates mul-
tiple millions of dollars more in economic activity in cities in 
which it has listings. When renters stay at an Airbnb location, 
they are often staying in local neighborhoods, eating at local 
restaurants, and shopping at local vendors.143 
Tax law is an easy case because it is designed to collect a 
percentage of profit from economic activities wherever the 
transactions were generated. The questions of collection are 
largely technical and require adaptation to new forms of deal-
ing.144 For pragmatic purposes, it may make sense to make the 
 
 139. Patrick Hoge, Airbnb Says It Has Paid Back Taxes to San Francisco, 
S.F. BUS. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/ 
2015/02/airbnb-paid-back-hotel-taxes-san-francisco.html. 
 140. E.g., Amina Elahi, Airbnb To Begin Collecting Chicago Hotel Tax Feb. 
15, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2015) http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/ 
originals/chi-airbnb-chicago-taxes-bsi-20150130-story.html. 
 141. Alan Pentico, Don’t Take a Vacation from Subletting Rules, SAN 
DIEGO SOURCE (June 16, 2014), http://www.sddt.com/Commentary/article 
.cfm?SourceCode=20140616tza&Commentary_ID=272&_t=Dont+take+a+ 
vacation+from+subletting+rules%23.VPAfZEvBFuY. 
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 143. Tim Logan, As L.A. Weighs Regulation, Airbnb Touts Its Economic 
Impact in City, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la 
-fi-airbnb-touts-its-impact-in-la-20141203-story.html (reporting Airbnb’s esti-
mated total economic impact in L.A. at $312 million in 2014). 
 144. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transpor-
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platform provider, rather than individual user, responsible for 
tax collection based on convenience and efficiency. Effectively, 
under current definitions, for the enterprise to avoid falling 
under the pertinent state regulatory scheme, the provider must 
be considered a pure broker of information rather than one of 
goods or services.145 This avoids defining the enterprise in a 
manner that makes state regulation applicable (i.e., Airbnb 
doesn’t provide hotel rooms; rather, it provides information to 
prospective guests and advertisements for hosts). In requiring 
the provider to collect and pay taxes derived directly from the 
end consumer, the state could be seen as implying that the 
platform provider is in fact the service provider, with the agent 
at the point of sale an employee. However, regardless of poten-
tial implications to the harder questions of liability, consumer 
protection laws, and employment protection laws, tax collection 
by the platform company may well be the most adequate and 
practical solution. As such, platform companies can become 
regulatory facilitators using their technological capacities to 
collect, as well as provide audited evidence of compliance in the 
era of decentralized peer-to-peer transactions. Importantly, the 
question of tax collection should thus be delinked from the def-
initional questions embedded in other bodies of law discussed 
below. Indeed, one insight emerging from a fresh look at the 
innovation-regulation framework mandated by the platform 
economy is that, rather than lumping all regulatory questions 
together and attempting to answer them as one, different regu-
latory bodies should be examined separately and with pur-
pose.146 
 
tation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69 
(2015); see also Martin Sullivan, Tax Challenges for the Uber Economy, 
FORBES (July 4, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/07/14/tax 
-challenges-for-the-uber-economy. 
 145. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 989, 1032–34 (2016); Mitch Lipka, How the Sharing Economy Makes Tax 
Filing Tougher, TIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.time.com/3822148/sharing 
-economy-taxes-uber-lyft. 
 146. See generally Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb's Woes Show How Far the Shar-
ing Economy Has Come, TIME (Oct. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/ 
07/airbnbs-woes-show-how-far-the-sharing-economy-has-come (describing the 
benefits of treating short term rental services, such as Airbnb, differently than 
rideshare services, such as Uber and Lyft). 
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C. HARD CASES: PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE PLATFORM 
1. The Experience Economy: Does Airbnb Violate Zoning 
Laws? 
City officials fear lodging platform companies like Airbnb 
will negatively affect residential life.147 While some cities are 
attempting to limit the lodging platform, others cities are 
changing their zoning laws to increase certainty and enable the 
rise of new lodge-sharing models.148 Zoning laws have multiple 
purposes. They attempt to keep residential areas quiet, clean, 
and safe, all of which can be at risk when increasing the num-
ber of transient users in these areas.149 They also may be de-
signed to increase a sense of neighborhood community and local 
familiarity.150 Zoning laws can also have population planning 
goals such as rent stabilization and an increase in the availa-
bility of affordable housing for students.151 
On February 1, 2015, a new city ordinance took effect in 
San Francisco that regulates vacation rentals in private 
homes.152 The law legalizes vacation rentals in private homes 
and restricts them to permanent residents who must register in 
person with the city’s planning department.153 Additionally, va-
cation rentals are limited to ninety days a year for entire-home 
rentals.154 Previously, residential rentals of less than thirty 
days were illegal, though the rule was only loosely enforced.155 
 
 147. See generally Julie Bort, San Francisco Makes Airbnb Legal at Last, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco 
-makes-airbnb-legal-at-last-2014-10 (discussing how local legislatures are re-
sponding to the growing popularity of services such as Airbnb). 
 148. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Gov-
ernment Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 931–34 (2015) (describing the range of local legislative re-
sponses to lodging platform companies). 
 149. Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Resi-
dential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. REG. 
91, 115–17 (2011) (detailing the progression of how zoning laws have been 
addressed, interpreted, and justified by various federal courts). 
 150. Id. 
 151. For examples of how zoning laws achieve these ends, see Rolf Pendall, 
From Hurdles to Bridges: Local Land-Use Regulations and the Pursuit of Af-
fordable Rental Housing, JOINT CTR. HOUSING STUD. HARV. U., 4–5 (2007). 
 152. Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. 
PLAN. DEP'T, http://www.sf-planning.org/office-short-term-rental-registry-faqs 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. This 90-day limit only applies when the owner of the home is not 
present during the time that the guests are renting the property. 
 155. Bort, supra note 147. 
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The law is not only designed to allow short-term private rentals 
but also to dissuade non-locals from buying San Francisco 
properties strictly for the business of short-term rentals.156 A 
housing shortage in San Francisco influenced the latter re-
striction, such that the law will keep San Francisco homes 
available for permanent residents.157 Although the law has 
barely taken effect, many are already seeking tighter regula-
tion of the lodging platform, such as an amendment that would 
allow affordable housing nonprofits to directly sue private hosts 
who break the law.158 
Others are advocating new legislation that “would create 
new insurance requirements for tenants who proceed with con-
verting their residence into a vacation rental.”159 The insurance 
would be “similar to what is offered to lodging and bed and 
breakfast companies, removing a landlord’s liability for person-
al injury and property damage done by a subletter.”160 Other 
local lawmakers, in cities such as San Diego, are pushing for 
legislation that would maintain zoning laws and the pre-
platform “stable and familiar feel of many residential neigh-
borhoods.”161 Airbnb has been deemed in some legal disputes 
around the country to violate local hospitality regulations, con-
dominium board rules, and other limitations on short-term 
housing usage.162 Criticism of Airbnb comes from many direc-
tions: angry hosts who found themselves the subjects of fines 
 
 156. See generally Mayor Lee Announces New “One-Stop Shop” Office of 
Short-Term Rental Administration & Enforcement, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. 
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and eviction notices as well as city officials who have received 
complaints from neighborhoods where disrespectful renters 
wreaked havoc.163 The safety, property value, and quality of life 
sentiments reverberate across local debates. 
Compared to San Francisco, New York has been more re-
sistant to the expansion of the lodging platform.164 New York 
law prohibits private owners from renting out their apartments 
for short periods unless they are living in the property.165 In 
fact, New York City residential zoning and rent control laws 
render nearly half of Airbnb rentals unlawful.166 In 2015, a New 
York judge upheld a landlord’s decision to evict a tenant who 
was caught leasing out his apartment for more than twice what 
he was paying his landlord.167 In particular, New York officials 
have been searching for illegal hotels in people who rent multi-
ple units on the Airbnb site. New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman has subpoenaed Airbnb for information regard-
ing 225,000 landlords, alleging that “as many as 75 percent of 
rentals on Airbnb are illegal under current [New York] law 
. . . .”168 Schneiderman has also attempted to get the company to 
shut down illegal hotels that have been developed by hosts.169 
In an attempt to cooperate with officials to identify hosts who 
operate de facto hotels rather than temporarily renting out 
their homes, Airbnb reported 124 hosts to the state attorney’s 
office that Airbnb found to have multiple listings on the site.170 
David Hantman, the Global Head of Public Policy for Airbnb, 
provided New York with suggested regulations that would stop 
these de facto illegal commercial hotels.171 Hantman suggests 
that first, the city should create tougher penalties for unli-
censed hotel operators and amendments that protect regular 
 
 163. Pentico, supra note 141. 
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New Yorkers who want to share their homes.172 Second, the law 
should be amended to allow owners to share space only in the 
home in which they live.173 Third, Airbnb has offered to pay for 
hosts’ hotel and tourist taxes, providing New York with $65 
million that can be used to fund public services in the city, in-
cluding increasing enforcement activity against illegal hotels.174 
A final suggestion has been that regulations should prohibit 
residents from making more money through home sharing than 
they pay in rent each month.175 
Rejecting the New York approach and embracing similar 
reforms as in California, the United Kingdom “announced plans 
to remove laws controlling short-term rentals . . . .”176 France 
too has legalized short-term rentals of primary residences.177 
Other international cities are accepting Airbnb but imposing 
various regulatory controls, such as Amsterdam and Berlin. 
Amsterdam allows residents to rent out their homes for up to 
two months of the year to up to four people at a time.178 Other 
global cities are reacting similarly to New York, such as Berlin 
and Barcelona, which have imposed increased restrictions on 
the operation of Airbnb.179 
The wisdom emerging from these recent developments and 
heated debates about the legality of the vast lodging platform is 
that regulatory controls are often a matter of legitimate social 
trade-offs and emphasize certain values. The residential nature 
of a city, the spread of affordable housing, the perceived and 
actual safety inherent in transient lodging are all questions 
that must be answered through the democratic process. These 
are hard questions because there is no one right answer. Most 
of the time, each choice involves preferring one social value 
over another. At the same time, the debates need to be based on 
facts rather than perceptions. Are jurisdictions that support the 
spread of the lodging platform more prone to safety issues? If 
so, can insurance, rather than zoning controls, address these 
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concerns? Using classic economics terminology, does Airbnb 
create more negative than positive externalities? Does the po-
tential noise of temporary lodgers endured by resident neigh-
bors outweigh the benefits of increased commercial activity in 
the neighborhood and affordable tourism overall? From an eq-
uity perspective, are jurisdictions that allow short-term rentals 
pricing the poor out of their neighborhoods? If so, can direct 
affordable housing solutions such as tax subsidies or new de-
velopment projects better address these concerns? 
These are questions that can only be answered over time, 
with data and analysis, and the balance will likely be struck 
differently in different communities.180 As the platform economy 
rapidly grows, many companies are running up against regula-
tory hurdles. As thousands of companies have transformed 
many aspects of our lives as consumers, workers, and citizens, 
the lines we drew through regulation are now being redrawn. 
The fluidity between home/hotel, ownership/loan, work/gig, and 
individual/business presents a challenge to policy makers. The 
hard questions that have always been at the core of regulation 
continue over to new business models. The problem is that 
many of the values we desire to promote as lawmakers—
freedom, equality, choice, fairness, and welfare—are not only in 
tension but also incommensurable.181 However, ideally, law-
makers should attempt to resolve these competing values with 
more fine-tuned solutions, such as targeted risk regulation, ra-
ther than direct blanket prohibitions. 
2. The Gig Economy: Does Uber Violate Employment Laws? 
Can you imagine if this turns into a Mechanical Turk economy, where 
everyone is doing piecework at all odd hours, and no one knows when 
the next job will come, and how much it will pay? What kind of pri-
vate lives can we possibly have, what kind of relationships, what kind 
of families? –Robert Reich182 
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From the perspective of labor market shifts, commentators 
worry that absent regulatory controls, the platform will lead 
work to be so app-driven that the internal logic of full-time em-
ployment, job security, and worker rights will collapse.183 The 
more labor there is in supply, the cheaper the pay, or put dif-
ferently, “the more humans are fungible; that is one human can 
replace another and do whatever that person is doing, the less 
they have value.”184 A leading critic of what is termed “the gig 
economy,” economist Robert Reich argues that the rise of plat-
form companies is making work life unpredictable, insecure, 
and, ironically, not even profitable.185 Based on interviews of 
platform workers, Reich “has concluded that ‘most would much 
rather have good, well-paying, regular jobs.’”186 
The concerns about the nature of employment in the twen-
ty-first century, while valid and significant, are largely misdi-
rected. The rise of the contingent workforce precedes the rise of 
the platform. The contingent workforce now constitutes more 
than one-third of all employees with predictions that it will rise 
to nearly half of the workforce by 2020.187 Given these realities, 
the question of whether one would rather have a high-paying 
stable job offline or a part-time job is misleading. The contrast 
should be to other available work options, whether enabled by 
the platform or not. With that comparison in mind, a new study 
by Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger mines through Uber 
data in order to analyze the work-life realities of Uber driv-
ers.188 The Krueger report finds that on average, Uber drivers 
work fewer hours and earn more per hour than traditional taxi 
drivers, even after accounting for their expenses.189 Moreover, 
most Uber drivers are employed full- or part-time elsewhere 
and work for Uber for additional income.190 
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At the same time, similar to many jobs, platform work 
raises questions about the nature of the relationship between 
the providers—drivers, cleaners, hosts, chefs, dog walkers, per-
sonal assistants—and the platform company. With definitional 
determinations comes legal responsibility. Many platform com-
panies—from the grocery delivery service Instacart to the cou-
rier service Postmates—involve people working in time frames 
and ways that posit a challenge to traditional modes of em-
ployment. The employment status of the providers on these 
companies remains uncertain. For example, Handy is a clean-
ing service, but unlike local cleaning franchises before it, it dig-
itally and directly connects customer with a cleaner and takes a 
fifteen percent commission of every hour worked.191 Handy clas-
sifies its cleaners as independent contractors.192 Handy cleaners 
recently brought a class action lawsuit alleging that Handy 
misclassifies them.193 The cleaners seek recognition of their sta-
tus as employees and, consequently, compensation for missed 
lunch breaks, minimum wage compensation, reimbursement 
for business expenses, and overtime.194 Handy has argued that 
its users “choose the Handy platform because it provides much 
needed flexibility by allowing them to book whatever jobs best 
suit them.”195 In the company’s terms of service, when referring 
to its cleaners, it includes at least five repetitions of an agree-
ment that they are independent contractors rather than em-
ployees, perhaps hoping repetition can replace solid legal ar-
gument.196 
The highest profile battles involve platform drivers. As we 
have seen, Uber asserts that it is only a software technology 
company, which provides a smart phone application that 
matches ride-seekers with drivers.197 Uber subsequently main-
tains that it 
does not employ drivers, own vehicles or otherwise control the means 
and methods by which a driver chooses to connect with riders . . . it 
merely provides a platform for people who own vehicles to leverage 
their skills and personal assets and connect with other people looking 
to pay for those skills and assets.198 
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While both Uber and Lyft have been firm in classifying 
their drivers as independent contractors, others have viewed 
the arrangement differently. Recent class action suits brought 
against both companies by drivers claiming misclassification 
stress the degree of control and direction the companies exer-
cise. In the Uber lawsuits, plaintiffs claim that, while drivers 
decide when to turn on the app to get notifications about ride 
requests, drivers “must respond to assignments generated by 
the Uber computer system ‘within seconds’ or they will lose the 
job.”199 Further, Uber sets the pickup time, the passenger pay 
rate, the method of pay, and which passengers the drivers must 
pick up.200 The payment goes to a centralized account set up by 
Uber.201 Uber has responded with other factors that support an 
independent contractor relationship: its drivers supply the in-
strumentalities of their work (the cars), are paid by the job, and 
control their work hours, their geographic area for pickups, and 
whether to accept a passenger’s request for a ride.202 While 
Uber drivers own the vehicle and smartphones with the re-
quired GPS, in some instances Uber provides these phones and 
assists drivers in securing leases for vehicles. In preliminary 
hearings in one such lawsuit, Judge Edward Chen stated, “The 
idea that Uber is simply a software platform, I don’t find that a 
very persuasive argument.”203 Chen found that the fact that 
“Uber sets the rates by which drivers are paid, screens them 
. . . and can terminate them” weighs in favor of finding them to 
be employees.204 In a parallel case against Lyft, the court stat-
ed, “[P]eople who do the kinds of things that Lyft drivers do 
here are employees.”205 In June 2015, the California Labor 
Commissioner, citing the high degree of control Uber exercises 
over its drivers, ruled in an individual hearing that at least one 
driver of Uber was an employee.206 In December 2015, a Cali-
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fornia court issued a final order certifying the Uber drivers case 
as a class action with trial set for June 2016.207 However, that 
trial now may not go forth. In April 2016, the plaintiffs filed a 
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement with Uber,208 
which was denied.209 The proposed settlement had two primary 
components: a $100 million payment, and promises to address 
the most problematic areas of Uber’s business practices.210 
Among those changes were the following: a clarified process for 
deactivating drivers, as well as a way for drivers to appeal their 
deactivation; a “Driver Association” comprised of elected driv-
ers that Uber agrees to meet with quarterly; and a promise to 
make good-faith efforts to informs riders that tips, though not 
required or expected, are not included in the fare.211 The set-
tlement would not have required Uber to reclassify drivers as 
employees so it leaves the question unsettled and could allow 
for new litigation of more groups of drivers in the future.212 
Lyft, like Uber, moved to settle its own class action in 
April, offering a $12.25 million settlement and agreeing to re-
move its at-will termination provision; instead, Lyft will only 
terminate drivers for specific, listed reasons and offer them a 
grace period to fix the problem.213 However, the judge denied 
that motion on the grounds the settlement amount was unrea-
sonably low, giving Lyft and the plaintiffs until May to negoti-
ate a new settlement consistent with his findings.214 In June 
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2016, the judge granted preliminary approval to a $27-million 
settlement.215 
While these mushrooming lawsuits are important, the em-
ployment law issues are hardly unique to the platform. Nearly 
a century after the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
uncertainty about the boundaries between covered employees 
and independent contractors is as high as ever. Indeed, the 
question of employee classification has been recognized as one 
of the most difficult and blurry judicial line-drawing techniques 
in the world of law.216 Recently, FedEx lost several class action 
suits that alleged misclassification of its drivers as independent 
contractors. In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems 
Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx held “all necessary 
control” over its drivers.217 Taxi drivers themselves, operating 
under the conventional pre-platform model, have similarly 
fought over their employment status. In Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 
the plaintiffs sought class certification of one hundred taxi 
drivers arguing companies misclassified them as independent 
contractors with respect to wage and hour law provisions of the 
California Labor Code and that, in turn, they were eligible for 
workers’ compensation insurance.218 The court denied certifica-
tion, holding that there was not enough commonality and 
raised questions about whether drivers fit under the common 
law test of an employee.219 The court pointed to the fact that 
taxi drivers had provided equipment, including cell phones, 
GPS, and credit card machines, and that some of the taxi driv-
ers advertised their services via the Internet, telephone yellow 
pages, and business cards.220 These are very similar context-
specific factors considered by the Uber class action court.221 In 
effect, these battles over employment status online and offline 
are virtually identical. They have to do with the challenge of 
line-drawing using multi-factor, common law tests that are of-
 
 215. Tracey Lien, Judge Approves Lyft’s $27-Million Class-Action Settle-
ment with Drivers, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-approval-20160623-snap-story 
.html. 
 216. Cf. Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539 
(2006) (arguing that work law has many substantive and historical layers 
making categorization difficult). 
 217. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 991, 997 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 218. Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 572 (2009). 
 219. Id. at 579–84. 
 220. Id. at 581. 
 221. See Motion, O’Connor, supra note 208. 
  
136 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:87 
 
ten outdated due to new patterns of work and production. Put 
differently, the problem is not work via the platform, but rather 
the legal definition itself, which is inherently complex. 
Contemporary realities may necessitate extending protec-
tions we find valuable as a society—dignity and anti-
discrimination principles, whistleblowing protections, insur-
ance and portable benefits, and occupational health and safe-
ty—to all laborers regardless of their employment status. Ra-
ther than insisting on archaic binary definitions of employee 
versus independent contractor, creative proposals consider a 
third category of “dependent contractor.”222 Former Chairwom-
an of the National Labor Relations Board, Wilma Liebman, has 
suggested such a category in a dissenting opinion of the NLRB, 
noting that “Canada and Germany have statutes protecting 
such workers.”223 Liebman stated, “Some people are clearly in-
dependent contractors and some are clearly employees, but a 
third category becomes necessary when you have people who 
are borderline,” while being economically dependent on one 
employer.224 Again, these questions are challenging but not 
unique to the platform. As part of the democratic process, each 
society strikes a balance between freedom of contract and em-
ployment protections, fairness, and welfare. The normative 
values embedded in these choices and their economic conse-
quences present difficult challenges. They are at the heart of all 
contemporary debates about law and economics at large.225 The 
platform provides new opportunities to continue these debates, 
but it does not transform or transcend these hard choices in 
any meaningful way. 
In 2014, the National Economic Council invited economists 
studying the platform, as well as key business and union lead-
ers, to the White House. The agenda was set to think about the 
shifts from traditional employment safety nets and new forms 
of work in the digital world. These shifting patterns are wide-
spread and not unique to the platform economy. As with the 
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case of lodging platforms, regulators should prefer solutions 
that directly address any negative consequences that people or 
society may experience from the rise of the platform, rather 
than blanket prohibitive solutions that stymie its develop-
ment.226 There are important legislative proposals designed to 
increase security in ways other than job stability. As venture 
capitalist Marc Andreessen explains, “Perhaps the single big-
gest key enabler for the sharing/gig/1099 economy in the US: 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, aka Obamacare.”227 Indeed, in 
some ways, HealthCare.gov has become a human-resources site 
for the platform economy.228 
The deeper questions about the desirability of 
commodifying every aspect and minute of one’s life, labor, skill 
and energy are more unique to the platform, but are likely un-
suitable for legal regulation. Is the platform further destabiliz-
ing job security and long-term employment? Is it a cause or a 
symptom of the shifting patterns of the labor market? The an-
swer is both. The rise of the platform is partly due to the de-
cline of full-time, long-term jobs and cycles of high rates in un-
employment. It also represents a shift in preference, as many 
people entering the labor market today prefer flexibility and 
control over their work-time. The platform also offers opportu-
nities to profit more directly from one’s labor. Compared to 
workers employed through manpower agencies, platform com-
panies allow for a greater share of the pay to go to the worker. 
To close with an optimistic perspective, the platform may 
also be an opportunity to connect workers to each other and 
organize in ways that were not previously available. Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk is an online platform that pays independent 
contractors cents per task. Millions of individual providers can 
speak directly to each other, compared with before when facto-
ry workers had to physically meet at odd hours and picket in 
front of their manufacturing plant. Using their online connec-
tivity, its workers have organized a letter-writing campaign to 
Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos asking him to “see that Turkers are 
not only actual human beings, but people who deserve respect, 
fair treatment, and open communication.”229 With the technolo-
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gy of the platform lowering barriers of entry, it is not impossi-
ble to imagine that a critical mass of discontent among provid-
ers could lead workers to create co-op versions of companies 
like Uber and Mechanical Turk.230 With the energy of creative 
cause lawyers, it is possible to envision a transportation plat-
form cooperative which adopts Uber-like technology and is es-
sentially driver-owned.231 The platform enables “ridiculously 
easy group-forming,” which “matters because the desire to be 
part of a group that shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a 
basic human instinct that has always been constrained by 
transaction costs.”232 Online communities have been able to or-
ganize and affect policy in other realms, such as organizing 
against SOPA/PIPA. Why not form online communities of plat-
form laborers? One such first initiative is Peers, an organiza-
tion for platform economy workers and an advocacy group for 
the platform economy that provides services to its members, 
such as personal-liability protection for homes and replacement 
cars for drivers.233 Peers describes itself as a “grassroots organi-
zation” with the goal to “mainstream, protect, and grow the 
sharing economy,” and it already has over 11,000 members and 
dozens of corporate partnerships.234 Other local groups of users 
are forming to share advice, think about policy, push risk and 
responsibilities back from the individual provider to the plat-
form company, and standardize pricing.235 
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3. The Cloud Economy: Does Aereo Infringe Copyright Law? 
In a different field of consumption, media content, the Su-
preme Court ruled in 2014 that Aereo, a provider of online 
streaming technology, was an illegal service operating in viola-
tion of copyright law.236 While commentators do not regularly 
describe the fight for over-the-air content access as part of the 
“sharing economy” defined by lodging and transportation apps, 
Aereo fits well within the rise of the platform. The new busi-
ness model in significant part turned on technological innova-
tion to better leverage the longstanding mandate for free local 
broadcasting. The technological innovation was a dynamic 
sharing of antennas, avoiding the cost of duplicating hardware 
from house to house. Aereo provided users access to hardware 
to capture broadcast and record content for time-shifting pur-
poses.237 Over-the-air content is free for individual interception. 
If you buy rabbit ear antennas and place them on your rooftop, 
you are free to watch any programming broadcast over the air 
without cost. Aereo sought to allow individuals to shift from 
ownership to access. It developed a bank of tiny antennas in 
each city in which it operated, which received local TV broad-
cast signals, much like old rabbit ears. Every time a subscriber 
wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo assigned an individual 
antenna to the subscriber. Aereo, viewed through the lens of 
the platform, was basically a cloud-based intermediary, ena-
bling people to intercept what they were free to consume direct-
ly. The challenge was that, in reality, users who subscribed to 
Aereo could intercept the local television package of any city in 
which Aereo operated, regardless of the user’s location. This 
meant that someone in California could purchase the local TV 
package for New York City, no longer intercepting in the same 
way that a local clunky rabbit ear would enable without the 
intermediary. Aereo’s controls on who could watch a certain 
television package were very loose; it required users to check a 
box stating, “I live in the designated area,” an affirmation simi-
lar to Airbnb’s warning of hosts to respect local zoning laws.238 
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Unsurprisingly then, much like other incumbents chal-
lenged by the platform, the broadcasting networks opposed this 
new business model and claimed that it violated their rights to 
receive transmission fees under the Copyright Act. In 2014, the 
Supreme Court ruled against Aereo, finding that Aereo had vio-
lated copyrights held by the networks.239 The point of conten-
tion was whether Aereo’s business model constituted a “public 
performance” rather than merely enabling individual view-
ing,240 and if so, Aereo would be legally required to obtain per-
mission from the copyright owners of any programs it trans-
mits.241 The court ruled in a six to three decision that Aereo’s 
business model was essentially like that of a cable television 
provider, publicly performing content, despite the great differ-
ences in technology.242 Following the decision, the company an-
nounced it would immediately suspend its services.243 In No-
vember 2014, Aereo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.244 Another 
company based on similar technology, FilmOn.com, has faced 
the same fate.245 
Aereo was put in a no-win situation.246 The Supreme Court 
told Aereo it needed a license as a cable provider in order to 
help transmit content to end users,247 yet Aereo was unable to 
obtain a compulsory license because it was an Internet provider 
not regulated by the FCC.248 Thus, Aereo is a striking example 
of a disruptive platform business facing protective regulations, 
outdated legal definitions, and strong industry foes. In 2015, 
the FCC released a new proposed rule for public comment on 
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permitting providers like Aereo.249 It might be too late for 
Aereo,250 but the rule will be impactful as online video services 
become more popular. 
If an Aereo copycat were to emerge under the new FCC 
rules, with a compulsory license, the new company might no 
longer need the geographic restrictions. Many viewers who 
have moved around enjoy watching the local television pro-
gramming from their hometown, especially in the areas that 
Aereo thrived in, such as live sporting events and live news. 
Similar to the way other platform companies customize con-
sumption for active users, Aereo provided these options, chang-
ing the nature and the range of options available in the area of 
television. Instead of consumers purchasing an enormous cable 
package and not watching seventy percent of the channels, and 
some of the preferred content is unavailable in their cable zone, 
Aereo provided a cheaper and more fine-tuned option. Moreo-
ver, Aereo helped to reduce the barriers to entry for small, in-
dependent broadcasters, who aired niche television content 
that broadcasters and cable companies ignored. These small 
broadcasters lacked the infrastructure and equipment to broad-
cast their channels beyond their locality. 
Along with the proposed FCC reforms, post-Aereo, there 
seem to be positive developments towards enabling innovation 
in this area without the threat of regulatory liability. In 2015, a 
California court refused to apply the Aereo decision to Dish 
Networks’ “DISH Anywhere” service, which allows users to 
watch live television on their smartphones or tablets.251 The 
court said that DISH Anywhere is different from Aereo because 
Dish has a license to transmit the programming while Aereo 
did not252: 
The ultimate function of DISH Anywhere is to transmit programming 
that is already legitimately on a user’s in-home hardware to a user’s 
Internet-connected mobile device. Relying on external servers and 
equipment to ensure that content travels between those devices 
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properly does not transform that service into a traditional cable com-
pany.253 
Aereo’s plight illuminates the risk for new platform busi-
nesses operating in the shadow of the law. Regulatory politics 
often decides the winners and losers in society; in this case, the 
founders of Aereo took an entrepreneurial risk and lost, in the 
face of massive established industry players resistant to dis-
ruption and protected by intellectual property law. Line-
drawing in intellectual property law is notoriously hard. Look-
ing ahead, the restrictions placed on platform companies 
should be ones that raise consumer welfare, rather than protect 
incumbent giants. It is pertinent to note a consensus in the 
regulatory literature about the importance of lobbying for de-
termining outcomes, as ambiguity in regulatory language is 
often resolved through political influence. Comparing the mag-
nitude of the TV networks, as a Goliath that Aereo could not 
overcome, Uber may be viewed as a digital unicorn in its lobby-
ing efforts against the taxi industry,254 which helps to explain 
the differences in outcomes of these regulatory battles. 
IV.  FROM CODE AS LAW TO PLATFORM AS REGULATION   
The key to this shift was the discovery that while we totally distrust 
strangers, we totally trust people—significantly more than we trust 
corporations or governments. –Joel Stein, Time Magazine255 
Modern digital communications allow sharing to happen across a 
global village of consumers and providers, with trust established 
through electronic peer reviews. –John Hawksworth, Chief Economist 
at PwC256 
A. LAW OF THE HORSE AND LAW OF THE PLATFORM 
In a short essay written for a symposium about the law of 
cyberspace, Judge Easterbrook began with the statement: 
[T]he University of Chicago did not offer a course in “The Law of the 
Horse.” [The Dean] did not mean by this that Illinois specializes in 
grain rather than livestock. His point, rather, was that “Law and . . .” 
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courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire 
law. Instead of offering courses suited to dilettantes, the University of 
Chicago offered courses in Law and Economics, and Law and Litera-
ture, taught by people who could be appointed to the world’s top eco-
nomics and literature departments—even win the Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics, as Ronald Coase has done.257 
For Easterbrook, there was nothing new about regulating 
the rising World Wide Web. The same principles that lawmak-
ers have always applied to earlier innovations in industry, 
technology, and business throughout history would be applied 
to this new space. At the same time, Easterbrook warned that 
regulatory errors are a great risk, especially in the face of tech-
nology that is not fully understood and still in formation.258 
Therefore, he urged policymakers to “not struggle to match an 
imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand 
poorly.”259 
Regulatory regimes should be understood as interrelated 
sets of rules based on the structure of industries, norms, and 
social goals. From a “law of the horse” perspective, every new 
business transaction is analyzable using standard micro-
economics transaction costs principles. For example, Easter-
brook may view taxi medallion regulations as a simple case of 
guild protectionism, while viewing zoning regulations as plau-
sible responses to externalities.260 As demonstrated earlier, reg-
ulators could view the new puzzles of the platform through the 
traditional framework of transaction costs analysis, yet a pure-
ly “law of the horse” lens would be incomplete. That is, the de-
velopments of the platform cannot be fully captured by analyz-
ing the terms of each deal digitally struck on a platform com-
pany, and the subsequent efficiencies created. The platform is 
also transforming the meaning of markets and actors in nu-
anced ways. Moreover, as will be discussed next, the platform 
lends itself to unique thinking about the right mix of private 
and public regulation. 
The distinctiveness of the regulatory questions presented 
by the rise of the platform lies in the potential these innova-
tions have for disrupting previously accepted legal categories 
and regulatory goals. The interplay of interrelated new models, 
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practices, and technology introduced by the platform requires 
us to revisit settled legal categories, as well as traditional regu-
latory solutions, and to create predictable and determined regu-
lations for new environments. In this sense, it is both true that 
the platform should be understood in light of basic legal princi-
ples that existed before its rise and that, unlike in the case of 
horses, there is something new and unique about the law of the 
platform. In particular, we have seen that platform business 
models have created new hybrids, which regulators must con-
template. Off-on categories such as consumer-business; em-
ployee-freelancer; residential-commercial are, in some instanc-
es, no longer viable as organizing frameworks. Unique fusions 
emerge as technology companies centralize some important as-
pects of the market transaction like, for example, the methods 
of payment, search and review, and information and trust. 
Simultaneously, these companies are decentralizing other fun-
damental aspects of the exchange controlled by users, such as 
pricing in the lodging apps and work hours in the transporta-
tion and cleaning service apps, aspects which once determined 
the supply infrastructure of a business. What this means for 
regulators is that, rather than a unified single entity, which 
has traditionally been the object of regulation, transactions are 
now shaped by multiple actors, with varying capacities, inter-
ests, and needs. The easy cases are where old categories and 
concepts, such as tax collection, are still applicable to new 
business models. The hard cases are those which require poli-
cymakers to revisit longstanding legal distinctions and funda-
mental regulatory goals. The platform economy is therefore a 
perfect setting to innovate, not only markets, but also the legal 
process. 
B. JUST AN APP? PLATFORM IMMUNITY AND THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
In 1996, in the early days of the Internet, the Communica-
tions Decency Act (CDA) was enacted to protect providers of an 
interactive computer service from civil liability for another’s 
actions. The Act holds that “[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”261 An overarching practical question in light 
of the shift to Web 3.0 is whether the CDA protects platform 
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business models. The Act provides a legal background against 
which Internet platforms like Airbnb can operate with some 
degree of legal certainty as to their liability for their users’ ac-
tions. Companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb, based on their 
self-definition as purely online tech sites, are arguing that they 
fall under the definition of the Act, which thereby protects 
them from civil liability.262 At the same time, the protection un-
der CDA is limited. Section 230 grants broad immunity to web-
sites with user-generated content, but it does not apply to In-
ternet sites that “materially contribute” in branding or shaping 
the transaction.263 Additionally, §230 does not apply to websites 
that materially contribute to unlawful content.264 Lastly, §230 
protects websites from neither federal criminal violations nor 
state law violations.265 
In 1995, a year before Congress passed the CDA, San 
Francisco-based programmer Craig Newmark created 
Craigslist.org, a website that enables users to post classified 
ads and interact in forums.266 Craigslist’s simple design, modest 
beginnings, and firm reluctance to selling advertisement space 
contributed significantly to its success in more than 450 cities 
worldwide.267 To date, Craigslist has avoided every civil charge 
raised against it under §230 and recently implemented changes 
to its website to avoid future liability.268 However, a recent case 
demonstrates the limits of §230 immunity.269 In a lawsuit action 
against Roommates.com, a matching site that allows people to 
find roommates, the court determined that immunity did not 
apply, because Roommates.com acted as an information content 
provider when it required website users to complete question-
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naires it had created.270 That is, Roommates.com contributed to 
the content users placed on its website. The court elaborated 
that §230 did not shield online service providers from civil 
claims when they materially contribute to the unlawfulness of 
the content.271 The court reasoned that “[t]he Communications 
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land 
on the Internet.”272 
Under this newer analysis, an interactive platform compa-
ny may not be as fortunate as Craigslist, but rather is more 
closely characterized to Roommates.com, and certainly may be 
liable for any illegal behavior if prosecutors bring criminal 
charges. There are fine lines separating conduct that would fall 
within the exceptions. If the service provider puts branding on 
elicited content; supplies the user with tools of the trade, such 
as GPS devices or equipment to process transactions; or sets 
the pricing and the transactional conditions, then it is unclear 
if the service provider is still a pure publisher. Still, the CDA 
has largely acted as a liability shield from civil litigation, and it 
is likely that, for the most part, platform companies will con-
tinue to enjoy at least partial immunity under the Act. As a 
consequence of this immunity, local and state agencies may fo-
cus some of their regulatory and enforcement powers on the 
users of platform services, instead of focusing on the actual 
companies.273 This result is problematic and recalls the prosecu-
tion of end-users who download music or infringe upon pa-
tents.274 At the same time, as we shall see in the next Section, 
platform companies have taken an active role in creating an 
infrastructure that provides grievance mechanisms, insurance 
coverage, and compliance controls, which together may operate 
as alternatives to traditional law and regulation. 
C. SYSTEMS OF STRANGER TRUST 
In olden times, villagers built trust through repeated in-
teractions with neighbors. Familiarity, proximity, reciprocity, 
continuity, repeat interactions, and immediate accountability 
in the small community enhanced compliance.275 Over time, as 
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exchanges grew in scale and pace, and as the corporate form 
took over, this trust was broken, and regulators stepped in. The 
platform is anything but a return to the small-scale communi-
ty. The platform is characterized by its vast ever-expanding 
scale, generated by access and connectivity between strangers. 
At the same time, access, scale, repeat interactions, and techno-
logical identification combine to create a new system of 
stranger-oriented trust. The platform is introducing new forms 
of private regulation: reviews, ratings, and social network rec-
ommendations. These features can combine to provide alterna-
tives to traditional regulation. Strikingly, the same technologi-
cal advancements that enable the rise of new business models 
also enable forms of dynamic mass monitoring and transparen-
cy. The confidence generated by state permitting, occupational 
licensing, and other regulatory requirements is substitutable 
with crowd confidence. 
Web 2.0 marketplace pioneer, eBay, was a leader in creat-
ing a “trust and safety” division and, not coincidentally, former 
eBay insiders led many next generation start-ups.276 The most 
successful new platform companies now offer similar services to 
increase user protection and confidence. Airbnb, for example, 
recently stepped up its own “trust and safety” unit when it cre-
ated an around-the-clock hotline.277 Airbnb also advises its 
hosts on best practices, recently holding its first ever conven-
tion with over 1500 of its most productive providers.278 The 
company has taken the lead in proactively engaging in 
knowledge sharing, building best practices, disseminating in-
formation about hospitality standards and guidelines, and sup-
porting meet-ups for hosts.279 From a regulatory compliance 
standpoint, Airbnb notifies its users about their obligation to 
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abide by their zoning restrictions, local government laws, and 
tax regulations.280 These notifications also come with a caveat: 
Airbnb users are warned in the terms and conditions on 
Airbnb’s website not to break any laws, but also are required to 
release the company from any responsibility for hosts’ compli-
ance with those laws.281 From a liability standpoint, as will be 
discussed in the following Subsection, Airbnb has gradually 
upgraded its standard insurance policy, which now covers 
$1,000,000 for loss or damages.282 
In a 2015 PwC survey, the majority of respondents report-
ed that they will not fully trust platform businesses until the 
questions of their regulation are settled: “[w]hen regulation is 
solidified, these business models will be fully legitimized—not 
just by law, but also in the minds and hearts of consumers.”283 
The following Sections examine the developments in self-
regulation of platform companies, which are often triggered by 
local and federal regulations. The Subsections proceed from the 
more traditional responses of insurance and background checks 
to the newer dynamic feedback systems of ratings and reviews. 
1. Insurance 
Insurance is the traditional response to regulating risk. Af-
ter Gawker published a story about a San Francisco woman 
whose house was vandalized by Airbnb renters in 2011, Airbnb 
added a $50,000 host guarantee against vandalism.284 Airbnb 
has since instituted its Host Protection Insurance program, 
covering up to $1 million primary liability for third party bodily 
injury or property damage.285 Most recently, in October 2015, 
the plan expanded to cover claims against landlords and home-
owners associations from guests who suffer injury during a 
stay, and claims against hosts filed by landlords for damages 
caused by guests to a building’s property.286 Airbnb also offers 
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an online Host Protection Resolution Center, a sophisticated 
and efficient internal dispute resolution system, which strives 
to resolve disputes within one week, far quicker than most pub-
lic and private grievance processes.287 When a dispute arises 
between guests and renters, parties are referred to the Resolu-
tion Center where the parties communicate directly.288 If the 
parties fail to reach an agreement, Airbnb can step in to arbi-
trate the dispute.289 In addition, a number of Airbnb policies 
serve to prevent disputes before they occur by allowing refunds 
within twenty-four hours in the event the rented accommoda-
tion is unacceptable.290 
Uber has similarly instituted a liability policy of $1 million 
in coverage for each trip.291 Other platforms similarly offer in-
surance for their users. For example, Feastly, a culinary plat-
form company, offers insurance when booking a culinary pop-
up event through its app.292 While leading platform companies 
initiated some of these developments, regulators play a role in 
directing a platform’s insurance policies. In Colorado, ride-
sharing companies must offer up to $1 million in liability in-
surance from the time a driver accepts a request to the moment 
when the rider leaves the car.293 California’s law is even more 
stringent than that, as starting July 2016, the law will require 
ride-sharing companies to provide insurance from the moment 
a driver turns on the app.294 Proposed legislation in the state of 
Washington, similar to California’s law, would require insur-
ance to be valid as soon as the driver logs into the app.295 In 
Washington D.C., the law requires ride-sharing services to pro-
 
 287. See What Is the Resolution Center?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ 
help/article/767/what-is-the-resolution-center (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 288. Ethan Katsch & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology and Dispute Sys-
tems Design: Lessons from the “Sharing Economy,” 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Winter 2015, at 8, 11. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 12. 
 291. Nairi, Insurance for Ridesharing with Uber, UBER, https://newsroom 
.uber.com/insurance-for-uberx-with-ridesharing (last updated July 8, 2016). 
 292. Anthony Ha, Feastly, A Marketplace for Dining Experiences, Raises 
$1.25M, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.techcrunch.com/2014/11/ 
25/feastly-seed-funding-westly-group. 
 293. Douglas MacMillan, Uber Laws: A Primer on Ridesharing Regula-
tions, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/29/uber 
-laws-a-primer-on-ridesharing-regulations. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Victoria Cavaliere, Washington State Lawmakers Consider Statewide 
Ridesharing Rules, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-usa-washington-ridesharing-idUSKBN0L625420150203. 
  
150 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:87 
 
vide primary insurance coverage “of at least $1 million per oc-
currence for accidents” from the time a driver accepts a call un-
til the passenger exits the car.296 The U.K. government recently 
brought insurance leaders together to design good policies for 
platform business models.297 
In some cases, regulators have brought action against plat-
form companies that have failed to comply with insurance re-
quirements. RelayRides, a peer-to-peer car rental company, re-
cently received a cease-and-desist letter from New York State’s 
Department of Financial Services (DFS), which charged 
RelayRides with “false advertising and violations of insurance 
law.”298 DFS also issued a “scam alert” because New York in-
surance law could leave car-sharing users unprotected in the 
event of an accident.299 DFS further stated that car-sharing 
programs may be in violation of existing insurance policies, 
which in turn may lead to users losing their coverage.300 Despite 
its continued ban from New York, RelayRides recently re-
branded itself under the name “Turo” and has raised funding in 
excess of $100 million.301 Turo updated its insurance policy to 
ensure it covers all of its travelers with at least the minimum 
coverage required by the state in which its users are located.302 
In addition, like Uber drivers, Turo car owners are provided 
with $1 million of insurance.303 Turo now operates in over 2500 
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cities and in every state except New York, and has recently ex-
panded into Canada.304 
2. Background Checks 
Background checks of providers are another traditional re-
sponse to risk. All ride-sharing legislation imposes safety regu-
lations that include driver background checks and car inspec-
tions. The area of disagreement is how stringent the tests 
should be. Colorado, for example, imposes background checks 
on Uber drivers that are less stringent than those required of 
taxi drivers. In Colorado, taxi drivers are subject to fingerprint 
background checks performed by the federal and Colorado bu-
reaus of investigation, while ride-sharing drivers remain vetted 
by private companies that use publicly available data.305 In 
2014, Illinois legislators passed two bills, supported by the taxi 
industry, that require state-conducted background checks for 
platform drivers.306 The governor vetoed these bills, and instead 
signed a less-stringent background check bill in 2015.307 New 
laws regulating ride-sharing in Virginia308 and Washington 
D.C.309 similarly require less-stringent background check re-
quirements. The D.C. law also requires transportation platform 
companies to suspend drivers when a customer complains of 
drug or alcohol use, or that the driver refused service on the 
basis of discrimination.310 
Regardless of state regulation, Uber itself, following media 
criticisms about the safety of its service, pre-screens its drivers 
in all localities using four separate checks: driving history; 
criminal background checks, including checks against the Na-
tional Sex Offender Registry; vehicle inspections; and medical 
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screening.311 The Uber driver’s car also undergoes testing and 
Uber sets requirements for auto quality.312 No Uber vehicle is 
allowed to be older than a 2004 model. In the area of home ser-
vices, TaskRabbit, matching over 30,000 “taskers,” pre-screens 
and provides background checks for each of its taskers.313 In 
lodging, Airbnb provides digital verification of government IDs 
of its users.314 
3. Ratings and Reviews 
More revolutionary than either insurance or background 
checks is the dynamic rating and recording of each transaction 
on the platform. At Uber, a bilateral record of every transaction 
is kept: riders rate drivers who rate riders. Safety is inherent in 
the design. Companies store each customer’s credit card and 
other identifying information in their system. The transactions 
are cashless and tip-less to disincentivize theft. The rating sys-
tem is not only provided to the riders and drivers, but is also 
operationalized. Riders or drivers that fall beneath a certain 
rating are suspended. Before suspending, Uber also has a con-
sultation process for drops in ratings and, while drivers have 
criticized the process for a lack of transparency, Uber promised 
to clarify its termination and consultation policies as part of the 
proposed settlement in O’Connor.315 All of these combine to in-
centivize consistently good service and behavior: 
[D]rivers have an incentive to provide great service because at the 
end of each trip, passengers rate them on a scale of 1–5 (with 5 being 
the best). Uber drops drivers with low scores—market incentives tend 
to yield better service than the “who else are you going to use” atti-
tude often associated with regulated monopolies such as taxis.316 
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At least from initial studies, it appears that these techno-
logical safety-by-design systems implemented by platform com-
panies are effective. For example, a recent study conducted by 
Zendrive, a company that looks at driving habits using smart 
technology, shows that taxi drivers were forty-six percent more 
likely to speed than a platform driver, including Uber, Lyft, 
and Sidecar, and eight percent more likely than a “nonprofes-
sional” private driver.317 Taxi drivers were also twenty-six per-
cent more likely than platform drivers to engage in other un-
safe practices such as cellphone use or hard-braking.318 
Technology allows for a variety of real-time monitoring. 
Uber and Lyft allow users to see the GPS path and monitor the 
driver-chosen route. These types of systemic controls align in-
centives on both ends of the deal. All users of the platform, 
whether buyers or sellers, host or guest, driver or rider, errand 
runner or errand giver, are interested in a successful transac-
tion to maintain high ratings. The identification, review, and 
ratings systems in turn create reciprocal trust that is multi-
layered: trust in participants; in value exchanged; in plat-
form/network. Pre-platform, consumer groups were the watch-
dog intermediaries of the market, but now watchdogging is 
crowdsourced. 
In many ways, these new forms of regulation are superior 
to traditional ones. Technology creates a record of each transac-
tion, and digital rating systems functionally substitute personal 
trust and regulated standards.319 Insurance focuses on liability 
when things go wrong. Background checks are backward look-
ing. But ratings systems are real-time and dynamic. They are 
relevant, updated, broad, and deep. Every service, product, and 
provider is tracked and reviewed for customer satisfaction. 
Every customer is also identified, rated, and reviewed. This 
creates a true Foucauldian panopticon, or what Eric Goldman 
has referred to as the “secondary invisible hand”: 
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BOLD ITALIC (Dec. 11, 2014), https://thebolditalic.com/study-finds-taxi-drivers 
-are-the-worst-drivers-the-bold-italic-san-francisco-fde1c187c055#.6mfg. 
 318. Id. 
 319. See Lior Strahlevitz, ‘How’s My Driving?’ for Everyone (and Every-
thing?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1759–65 (2006) (explaining how technology 
can expand citizen policing to even loose-knit environments). 
  
154 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:87 
 
When information . . . is costly, reputational information can improve 
the operation of the invisible hand by helping consumers make better 
decisions [about vendors]. In this case, reputational information acts 
like an invisible hand of the invisible hand . . . because reputational 
information can guide consumers to make marketplace choices that in 
aggregate enable the invisible hand.320 
Above the layer of the reviews of each individual company, 
specialized consumer review sites aggregate information and 
compare reviews across companies, making such sites more 
important than advertising.321 Aggregators include sites like 
AlltheRoom, which looks at the various competing lodging plat-
forms and presents information about all availabilities. Such 
aggregators ensure competitive price and quality. The most in-
teresting aggregators highlight individual providers who are 
active across various platforms. Increasingly, the platform of-
fers layers of reputational certification. AirtaskerPRO, for ex-
ample, offers background checks and even in-person interviews 
for anyone providing platform services. Another example, 
Klout, offers a reputational capital tool which aggregates gen-
eral online influence, e.g., measuring the number of times one’s 
Facebook posts are viewed.322 Many of these start-ups seek to 
expand the reputational information of their brands to reach 
potential new consumers through the use of an application pro-
gram interface (API).323 APIs allow third-party developers to 
integrate the services of another company directly into its ap-
plication. To illustrate, Uber expanded its API to include eleven 
new partners ranging from TripAdvisor and OpenTable to 
Starbucks and Hyatt Hotels.324 Now, a user who makes a reser-
 
 320. Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: 
HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 51, 53 (Hassan 
Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2011); see also Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing 
Reputation Systems for the Social Web, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW 
ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 3, 7 (Hassan Masum 
& Mark Tovey eds., 2011) (listing ways to aggregate and display reputation 
information); Liangjun You & Riyaz Sikora, Performance of Online Reputation 
Mechanisms Under the Influence of Different Types of Biases, 12 INFO. SYS. & 
E-BUSINESS MGMT. 417, 418 (2014). 
 321. See Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMM. ACM 45, 46 
(2000) (noting that registered retailers who have profiles in websites such as 
bizrate.com foster trust among consumers). 
 322. Alyson Shontell, How a Guy Who Had His Jaw Wired Shut for 3 
Months Used the Experience To Build a $200 Million Startup, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-klout-sold-for-200 
-million-2014-3 (explaining the rise of Klout and its founder, Joe Fernandez). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Ryan Lawler, Uber Opens Its API with 11 Launch Partners, Including 
OpenTable, TripAdvisor, and United Airlines, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 20, 2014), 
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vation at a restaurant through the OpenTable app or books a 
room through TripAdvisor can request an Uber driver directly 
from those third-party apps. Success in the platform economy 
often comes down to reaching and retaining more users, and 
API utilization exposes potential users to new platforms 
through the apps they already use. 
Beyond cross-reputational aggregators, platform compa-
nies increasingly rely on the overall social capital that each 
participant develops online. For example, Airbnb asks users to 
provide links to their social media profiles, including Facebook, 
Google+, Twitter, and LinkedIn. In essence, ratings are getting 
another step up—delinked from one digital service or company, 
and creating a multi-layered trust pyramid that becomes richer 
and thicker over time.325 Licensing rose as the consumer protec-
tion default for quality control. But once the technology is in 
place and a critical mass of participants and points of data is 
reached, systems of online trust may be more effective than 
traditional one-shot regulation. 
 
https://www.techcrunch.com/2014/ 08/20/uber-api-part-deux. 
 325. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The Trust Pyramid 
 
D. DESIGN AROUND REGULATION: ARBITRAGE, CIRCUMVENTION, 
LOOPHOLES AND NEGATIVE SPACES 
We have seen that definitional defiance is central to the 
business model of the platform. At the same time, law is all 
about definitions. A fundamental challenge for regulators is 
what we might call the notorious GRC, the Goldilocks Regula-
tory Challenge: getting law just-right with neither definitional 
over-inclusiveness nor under-inclusiveness. Inevitably, there 
are always loopholes around definitions meant to apply to new 
circumstances, resulting in under-inclusive coverage. At the 
same time, because of the limits of imagination and the inevi-
table lag of law behind life, we can expect regulation through 
false analogies and the insertion of new circumstances into ex-
isting boxes that no longer fit the goals envisioned by their de-
signers, inevitably resulting in over-inclusive coverage. 
Different bodies of law have dealt with the Goldilocks Reg-
ulatory Challenge in varying ways. First, it is useful to consider 
the concept of regulatory arbitrage,326 developed primarily with-
 
 326. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) (explaining the origins and concept of 
regulatory arbitrage). 
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in scholarship in the context of tax and financial planning. 
Regulatory arbitrage is 
a perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting 
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs. Regulatory 
arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a trans-
action and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the 
legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that 
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.327 
Regulation imposes costs and if that cost can be reduced, 
both sides of the transaction, the buyer and seller or user and 
provider, can split the savings. The challenge of sorting out 
regulatory avoidance from innovation is at the core of debates 
about the regulation of new business models: 
When new forms are chosen because they reduce transaction costs, 
legal innovation presumptively increases efficiency. But when new 
forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase 
transaction costs compared to the old structure, we lose twice: effi-
ciency is reduced by the increase in transaction costs, and the regula-
tory burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage.328 
Under regulatory arbitrage, a key to differentiating regula-
tory avoidance and legitimating innovation is to track “the eco-
nomic substance of deals in accordance with the policy goals of 
that regime” as closely as possible.329 Focusing on the substance 
of the deal, we have seen that technology and economic efficien-
cies have driven the rise of the platform economy. If a platform 
company is avoiding costs that are part of the policy goals of a 
legal regime, then regulators can step in to extend require-
ments to the new business model. Still, the economic and social 
logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in all 
stages of the deal, as well as creating new markets that map 
onto new preferences and lifestyles, is the primary raison d’être 
of the rise of the platform. Therefore, it is largely the case that 
the substance of the deal is to create efficiency not directly 
linked to regulatory avoidance. 
Another field of law that can offer insight into the defini-
tional defiance dilemma is copyright law. This area of law 
grapples directly with technological progress and new economic 
models. The “anti-circumvention” provisions of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act codified in §1201 of the Copyright Act, 
were enacted to stop copyright infringement by preventing 
 
 327. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 
(2010). 
 328. Id. at 275. 
 329. Id. 
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technological advances from defeating anti-piracy protections 
built into copyrighted works.330 Proponents of anti-
circumvention laws have argued that it was necessary to ex-
tend existing protections into new forms of consumption and 
digitization. Conversely, similar to more recent debates about 
regulating the platform, critics of these policy expansions have 
argued that the push comes from entrenched business inter-
ests.331 A central insight from anti-circumvention critics is that 
the law overreaches. Regulation through anti-circumvention 
prevents not only infringement but also fair use.332 In Aereo, the 
architecture of the system was viewed by the dissent in the Se-
cond Circuit Court as “over-engineered” and a “Rube Goldberg” 
model.333 The Supreme Court later agreed and viewed the tech-
nological innovation as designed with the sole purpose of avoid-
ing the black-letter copyright law, or in other words, it equated 
definitional defiance with regulatory avoidance.334 The Court 
dismissed the argument that the technological differences 
made Aereo legal, revealing an anti-circumvention lens under 
which the default response for technological change is expan-
sion of the regulatory coverage.335 A different concept within 
intellectual property may better serve policymakers as they 
continue to strive for smart regulatory measures, while encour-
aging innovation and progress. In patent law, unlike the sche-
ma of circumvention, which pervades copyright law, the con-
cept of “design around” offers a default approach that views 
definitional defiance as positive. Indeed, patent law “has long 
recognized the policy justification of inventing around which is 
 
 330. 44 Cong. Rec. H7093, H7094-5 (Aug. 4, 1998); Senate Judiciary 
Comm., S. Rep. 105-190 (1998) at 29; Judiciary Comm., H. Rep. 105-551 Pt 1 
(1998) at 18; House Commerce Comm., H. Rep. 105-551 Pt 2 (1998) at 38. 
 331. E.g., Unintended Consequences: 15 Years Under the DMCA, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended 
-consequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca (giving examples of how DMCA has 
enabled businesses and the government to censor and chill research and ex-
pression). 
 332. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: 
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 519, 537–57 (1999) (claiming the non-infringing uses of the copy-
right bill are too narrowly tailored). 
 333. Adam Liptak, Justices Skeptical of Aereo’s Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/business/media/supreme-court 
-hears-arguments-in-aereo-case.html. 
 334. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 
(2014). 
 335. Id. at 2508–09. 
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sometimes touted as one of the benefits of the patent system.”336 
Competitors to the patent holder are encouraged to invest their 
creativity and resources to finding substitutes to the patented 
technology. The concept of design around thus offers a produc-
tive lens from which to view innovation: seeking alternative 
models to dominant competitors should be assumed to be per-
missible. Indeed, this shift in the default assumptions of busi-
ness innovation fits well with a broader shift in contemporary 
regulatory theory. 
In recent decades, regulation has shifted away from com-
mand-and-control to more participatory modes of rule-making, 
compliance, and enforcement. If law was once conceptualized as 
national, top-down, and sanctioned under the New Deal regula-
tory model, the beginning of the twenty-first century has 
marked a new regulatory paradigm: that of governance. 
Against the backdrop of global competition, changing patterns 
of production, and a declining commitment to direct legal inter-
vention, policymakers have been experimenting with more par-
ticipatory and collaborative models of regulation, in which gov-
ernment, industry, and society share responsibility for achiev-
ing policy goals. Under this model, platform companies can be 
viewed as partners, rather than adversaries, of the legal pro-
cess. The governance paradigm encourages multiple stakehold-
ers to share traditional roles of governance. Highlighting the 
increasing significance of norm-generating nongovernmental 
actors, the model promotes a movement downward and out-
ward, transferring responsibilities to states, localities, and the 
private sector—including private businesses and nonprofit or-
ganizations. Lawmaking shifts to a reflexive approach, which is 
process-oriented and tailored to local circumstances. At the 
same time, by linking together geographically and materially 
dispersed law reform efforts, the model provides innovative 
ways to coordinate local efforts and to prevent the isolation of 
problems: 
Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and 
encouraging the replication of success stories from local or private 
levels become central goals of government. Legal orchestration is 
achieved through interpenetration of policy boundaries, new pub-
lic/private partnerships, and next-generation policy strategies such as 
negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-based 
 
 336. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 
64, 67 (2014). 
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rules, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure regimes, 
and coordinated information collection.337 
One of the key principles under the new model of regula-
tion is the principle of permanent learning. Max Weber warned 
that 
those who continuously participate in the market intercourse with 
their own economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of 
the market and interest [in the] situation than the legislators and en-
forcement officers whose interest is only ideal . . . . It is those private 
interested parties who are in a position to distort the intended mean-
ing of a legal norm to the point of turning it into its very opposite.338 
While Weber emphasizes learning capacities of regulated in-
dustry, under a new governance framework, smart regulation 
aids positive evolution of policy and prevents ossification.339 The 
advanced technological capabilities of the platform economy 
can be revolutionary in aiding this practice by allowing better 
data collection and analysis. The business of regulatory agen-
cies becomes more about regulatory research and development 
than rule-making and enforcement.340 With data and research, 
we can continue to address the key questions for the law of the 
platform: Are new business models presenting an opportunity 
of systematic reduction in transaction costs rather than simply 
a shift in rents from incumbents to new firms? Are there new 
kinds of inequities and systematic market failures in the rise of 
the platform? Can some of these failures, such as asymmetric 
information, be rectified by the very technology that helps the 
transactions? Are there other types of failures, for example ex-
ternalities of third-party safety or the rise of quasi-monopolies, 
that require public regulation? The message of new governance 
is to continue engaging these challenges with a data-driven, 
multi-stake collaborative framework, experimenting with dif-
ferent solutions to encourage innovation. In other words, we 
want to keep the platform weird, diverse, and fair. 
 
 337. Lobel, supra note 109, at 345. 
 338. Max Weber, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 38 (Max Rheinstein 
ed., Edward Shils trans., 1954). 
 339. E.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (listing framework of how to implement 
smart regulation). 
 340. Id. at 31 (“In the collaborative model, the state is in the business of 
regulatory research and development.”). 
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E. KEEP THE PLATFORM WEIRD BUT EQUITABLE: A DIGITAL 
NEW DEAL 
Why has the Internet proved to be such a powerful engine for creativ-
ity, innovation, and economic growth? . . . A big part of the answer 
traces back to one key decision by the Internet’s original architects: to 
make the Internet an open system. –FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski341 
A promising aspect of the contemporary law of the platform 
is that many of the regulatory questions of Web 3.0, including 
zoning, consumer protection, residential and transportation 
safety, worker rights, and occupational licensing, are tradition-
ally resolved at the state and local levels. This decentralization 
lends to a productive natural experiment. Local governments 
can see the benefits of collaborating and participating in the 
platform economy and try different paths toward the policy 
goals with which they are charged. The Brandeis dream of la-
boratories of experimentation, with its contemporary iteration 
in new governance theory calling for democratic experimental-
ism, can be realized at this moment of immense simultaneous 
innovation across so many industries in so many localities.342 
For example, cities, as well as private homeowner’s associa-
tions, can position themselves on any point of the spectrum 
ranging from platform-friendly to platform-free.343 
Notably, first-mover platform companies appear to want 
some light regulation as they attempt to shape the regulatory 
field. Indeed, the most successful unicorn start-ups quickly be-
come incumbents, and one way to prevent competition is to ac-
cept certain regulatory requirements that will prove more bur-
densome to newcomers. Put differently, similar dynamics of 
resistance through the insistence of regulatory barriers of en-
try, which existed when platform companies first challenged 
their offline competitors, are likely to occur in the competition 
among platform companies. It is possible that Web 3.0 platform 
 
 341. Michael Moyer, Better Broadband: New Regulatory Rules Could 
Change the Way Americans Get Online, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www 
.scientificamerican.com/article/bigger-better-broadband (quoting FCC Chair-
man Julius Genachowski). 
 342. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–16 (1998) (arguing that differing 
local government policies allow local governments to learn from each other). 
 343. See, e.g., Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 3, at 931–32 (showing exam-
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companies will be able to sustain more competition by robust 
differentiation of services, as opposed to previous generations of 
search (Google), social media (Facebook), and retail (Amazon), 
which have emerged as quasi-monopolies. 
Still, first-mover advantage is key, especially with a busi-
ness model that relies on scale of user network for effective 
supply and demand. As the nature of platform companies con-
tinues to evolve, it is likely that, as some of these dominant 
first-mover companies transition from upstarts to the “estab-
lishment,” new opportunities for disruption will emerge. This 
has been the trajectory of many Web 2.0 companies, such as 
eBay and Amazon, which started as a collection of individual 
sellers and small sellers and quickly shifted to include main-
stream retail operations. The platform is similarly transform-
ing in some parts. At Airbnb, many homes are now listed by 
professional property managers, which lead private users to 
voice concerns that raising the standards and requirements 
from hosts will deter casual hosts from this leading platform 
company.344 Similarly, Uber drivers are now frequently not 
simply private individual users, but rather drivers hired by 
small businesses operating small fleets of cars.345 There are re-
cent indications that precisely because of reliance of scale effi-
ciencies, the transportation platform operates under “winner 
takes all” conditions, where only a few survive and the rest fall 
out of the race.346 
Thus, the platform economy offers us the important insight 
that business models continuously change. Business identity 
shifts from upstart to establishment and with it the interests of 
stakeholders, with regard to regulatory requirements, shift as 
well. Moreover, traditional offline competitors are likely to look 
increasingly like new platform companies as a result of fruitful 
disruption of their established long-standing practices. As one 
 
 344. Drew Fitzgerald, Airbnb Moves into Professional Vacation Rentals, 
WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-signals 
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analyst commented with Internet startups and established 
businesses, “the worlds are actually converging in both direc-
tions.”347 The platform will gradually seek new avenues to 
commercialize offline and established pre-platform industries 
will inevitably venture to electronic services. 
Most importantly, to understand the continuous evolve-
ment of the platform, analysts require data and sustained re-
search. With their technological sophistication and foresight, 
platform companies have taken a leading role in presenting in-
formation about their own social and economic effects. They 
have introduced studies that suggest positive effects of the plat-
form on emissions, tourism, and the labor market.348 These 
studies are useful, but not without the danger that they are 
directed, or at least funded, by the interested parties them-
selves, in large part as a way to convince legislatures and regu-
lators, alongside the public, to support their growth. Under new 
governance theory, as new business models are introduced, 
regulatory agencies should view themselves not merely as reac-
tive enforcers, but also as active researchers of these changes.349 
Equity issues should continue to be examined with the ex-
pansion of the platform. As we have seen, the platform, through 
its access and decentralization of supply, can have a tremen-
dous positive impact for individuals who wish to capitalize on 
their previously un-monetized talents and abilities. A key ques-
tion for policy will continue to be whether platform companies 
are serving the poor and underserved. Some evidence of dispar-
ities and inequality is beginning to emerge with regard to cer-
tain services. Both Uber and Lyft are currently facing litigation 
in multiple states under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).350 In one case, an Uber driver allegedly placed a disabled 
passenger’s service dog in the trunk, while other drivers are 
alleged to have sped past riders waiting in wheelchairs.351 As 
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with its employment disputes, in these cases Uber argues that, 
because it is a technology company and not a transportation 
company, it does not fall under the purview of the ADA.352 Uber 
claims it cannot control the actions of its drivers who refuse to 
accept passengers with disabilities because the drivers are in-
dependent contractors, and thus, Uber has no legal obligation 
to ensure they comply with the ADA. However, in April the 
judge denied Uber’s motion to dismiss, finding that more factu-
al development was needed before the court could rule on 
Uber’s qualifications as a “specified public transportation ser-
vice,” and whether it would, as a result, be liable under the 
ADA.353 Uber, possibly in response to pending litigation, recent-
ly launched its UberASSIST service to provide senior citizens 
and people with disabilities with specially trained drivers.354 
Discrimination may also pervade renting of homes through 
Airbnb, but the company has been making a visible effort to 
send a clear message of zero tolerance.355 A new study conduct-
ed by researchers at Harvard Business School found that re-
quests from guests with distinctively African American names 
are sixteen percent less likely to be accepted than identical 
guests with distinctively white names.356 These differences per-
sisted whether the host was male or female, African American 
or white. To reduce discrimination, the authors of the study 
suggest that Airbnb, like traditional hotel chains, should re-
quire hosts to accept guests without revealing the guest’s name 
first.357 However, when Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky announced 
Airbnb’s Verified Identification program in 2013, he stated that 
“[a]ccess is built on trust, and trust is built on transparency. 
When you remove anonymity, it brings out the best in people 
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. . . . We believe anonymity has no place in the future of Airbnb 
or the sharing economy.”358 
These emerging challenges of equity and identity on the 
platform reveal the inevitable points of tension that policymak-
ers have always faced. Balancing equality and anonymity, in-
clusion and credibility, and safety and privacy is not a new le-
gal challenge. At the same time, the platform presents new op-
portunities for monitoring and compliance in order to reach a 
desirable delicate balance. Technology-based monitoring can 
detect misbehavior in more accurate and fine-tuned ways than 
broad-brush rules that risk stifling experimentation and 
growth. As private entities, platform companies can respond 
swiftly and strongly to incidences of discrimination. Airbnb’s 
anti-discrimination policy informs hosts about compliance with 
federal and local laws, such as the Fair Housing Act and the 
ADA.359 Airbnb asserts that it “respond[s] quickly to any con-
cerns raised by hosts or guests, and [has] a zero-tolerance poli-
cy for discrimination on [its] platform.”360 In April 2015, Airbnb 
removed a Texas bed and breakfast from its listings after its 
host reportedly discriminated against a gay couple.361 Airbnb 
refunded the money paid for the booking and paid for a night at 
the hotel that the couple ultimately stayed in.362 The company 
also issued a statement condemning the incident: “AirBNB has 
clear guidelines that a host or a guest may not promote hate or 
bigotry.”363 Following this model, transportation platform com-
panies could also do more with regard to anti-discrimination 
detection and enforcement. One of the great advantages of plat-
form companies’ self-regulation of such issues is the very low 
costs involved in looking at the data digitally presented and 
reacting forcefully against misconduct by disconnecting a driver 
from the app. 
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At the same time, there are types of equity issues that may 
be harder to deal with. While the mutual rating and review 
systems widely adopted on the platform have positive implica-
tions for trust and credibility, rating systems may also be af-
fected by biases informed by attitudes on race, sexual orienta-
tion, or disability.364 Because services like Uber generally con-
tain a photo of the rider, drivers can easily dismiss passengers 
of color or those requesting service to a poorer neighborhood for 
non-minority passengers seeking a more upscale destination. 
Here again, large-scale systematic data analysis, drawing on 
the growing technological sophistication of the platform, is key. 
Large-scale data can help inform policymakers about patterns 
of discrimination better than the inevitable arbitrariness in-
herent in case-by-case discrimination litigation.365 As with the 
other regulatory questions analyzed above, regulators could 
potentially require platform providers to disclose such data and 
assist with its analysis. 
  CONCLUSION   
The platform economy has incredible potential upsides, but 
its rise will continue to leave a wake of disruptive effects that 
are not unambiguously positive. When we fundamentally alter 
the way that we interact with others, we create new possibili-
ties for efficiency and for achieving social goals. At the same 
time, we face the possibility that market innovation under-
mines existing policy choices as well as introduces new avenues 
for abuse. A deep understanding of the dynamics of the plat-
form economy, its logic, and the efficiencies it creates, can bet-
ter guide policymakers through the vast range of legal fields 
and legal categories currently unsettled. An ongoing study of 
the nature and effects of the rise of the platform will better in-
form the law in the continuous search for the optimal balance 
between innovation and regulation. 
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 365. See Lobel, supra note 109; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employ-
ment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462–64 
(2001) (arguing that a new framework is needed to combat implicit biases and 
lays out new framework). 
